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Abstract 
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 In May of 2013, National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden flew to Hong 
Kong with thousands of classified NSA documents. He contacted Glenn Greenwald, blogger, 
activist, and journalist for The Guardian. Greenwald and several other reporters flew to Hong 
Kong, where they spent a week interviewing Snowden. Greenwald began reporting on the 
documents in The Guardian, publishing many articles that demonstrated that the US government 
was spying on US citizens without court warrants. The leak was considered the biggest in NSA 
history. One year later, Greenwald published No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, The NSA, and 
The U.S. Surveillance State. In this book, he discussed his meeting with Snowden, the NSA 
documents, and his concerns about the US surveillance state.  
 In both Greenwald’s Guardian articles and No Place to Hide, the journalist discusses the 
implications of NSA surveillance. He explains technical means of surveillance and encourages 
the public to resist these tactics. Analyzing Greenwald’s rhetoric, I find that he takes a 
Foucauldian perspective on surveillance. NSA surveillance, Greenwald argues, leads citizens to 
self-discipline and suppress their own dissenting thoughts because of the possibility of being 
watched at any time.  
Additionally, Greenwald’s case can be analyzed through Goodnight’s three spheres of 
argument. Many scholars express concern that the technical sphere, which is open to only elite 
members with specialized knowledge, is eclipsing the public sphere, or the arena in which 
citizens discuss matters of common concern. This case demonstrates the effects of a public 
sphere pushback on isolated, technical arguments. Greenwald calls for the public sphere to 
deliberate as an antidote to surveillance. He characterizes the NSA as an isolated technical 
community which does not consider public concerns. Central tenets of the public sphere include 
public access and openness, and central tenets of surveillance power include public 
inaccessibility and technical closure. Greenwald’s rhetoric juxtaposes these competing values to 
encourage public sphere resistance of surveillance. He asks his readers to resist the NSA by 
continuing to discuss NSA surveillance.  
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Resisting NSA Surveillance: Glenn Greenwald and the public sphere debate about privacy 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 Many people have written, spoken, and blogged about growing privacy concerns. A 
chorus of voices discuss data mining, corporate information gathering, and government 
observation. The development of surveillance technology has far outpaced the development of 
legal protection against it, and the modern world has bought into the convenience of the digital 
world without a discussion of the consequences. This discussion has finally caught up. In the 
wake of Chelsea Manning's military trial
i
, Julian Assange's creation of WikiLeaks
ii
, and Edward 
Snowden's revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA)
iii
, the time has come for a 
national and international discussion. But some worry that the public is past concerns about 
privacy.  
 Glenn Greenwald attracted much attention in May of 2013 when he began writing about 
Edward Snowden's NSA documents. This was not Greenwald's first discussion of privacy. He is 
a constitutional lawyer who started a blog, Unclaimed Territory, to discuss privacy concerns, in 
2005 (Greenwald, 2006). In 2006, he published his first book, How Would a Patriot Act?, 
criticizing President George W. Bush's policies about surveillance and torture. He later became a 
blogger for Salon and a writer for The Guardian. Greenwald continues to reveal new information 
in newspapers, on his personal blog, and on his new news service, The Intercept. His most recent 
book, No Place to Hide, about his contact with Edward Snowden, was published in 2014.   
 A strong voice in the current privacy debate, Greenwald writes about the erosion of 
privacy and the effects this has on the American people. Snowden himself said that he only 
wished to release his documents to the public so that they could decide for themselves if the 
NSA's spying was justified (Greenwald, 2014). Greenwald's rhetoric calls attention to Snowden's 
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revelations, and may create a public demand for more checks on surveillance, if Americans 
choose to take up this discussion. In the following chapters, I argue that Greenwald characterizes 
the public discourse about surveillance as one marked by silence or confined to the technical 
sphere. He argues that discussion about the NSA should take place in the public sphere, and, in 
doing so, he encourages resistance to surveillance. He believes this must occur on a macro-level 
through a widespread discussion of the NSA in the public sphere.  
 In what follows, I offer background on the National Security Agency, Edward Snowden's 
leaked documents, and Glenn Greenwald. Next, I describe Greenwald's writings, which will be 
analyzed in subsequent chapters. Third, I provide a theoretical background of the public sphere, 
G. Thomas Goodnight's spheres of argument, Foucault's writings on surveillance, and resistance 
to surveillance.  
Context and Background 
Founding the NSA 
 The National Security Agency (NSA) started as a group of code breakers who intercepted 
enemy radio message during World War Two. President Harry Truman declared the group a 
national agency in 1952 (National, 2012). The NSA has assisted the United States with 
intelligence operations throughout every conflict since the 1950s, and the organization has grown 
with each passing decade. The NSA uses signals intelligence (SIGINT) to intercept electronic 
communication and gain information. Signals intelligence uses sensors which intercept signals 
intended for other receivers. Transmissions intercepted can include vocal communication or 
electronic signals, such as those produced by a radar or missile system. Notable contributions, 
according to the NSA's own website, include SIGINT support during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Desert Storm, and the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden (National “60
th
”, 2012).  
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 After World War Two, government trust was high, and the NSA was relatively unknown 
to the public. However, starting in the 1960s, a time of unrest prompted changes for the agency. 
In the early 1970s, reporters uncovered a series of scandals about US intelligence activities. First, 
two of the Watergate burglars were found to be CIA veterans (DeYoung & Pincus, 2007). Then 
in 1974, reporter Seymour Hersh revealed that the CIA had attempted to infiltrate anti-war 
groups from the 1950s through the 1970s (DeYoung & Pincus, 2007).  As a result of these 
revelations, the Senate voted to establish an independent investigative committee in 1975. Led 
by Senator Frank Church, and nicknamed the Church Committee, this group investigated 
wrongdoing by various US intelligence agencies (United States Senate). Though the committee's 
findings were jumbled, it effectively demonstrated the need for oversight of the intelligence 
community (United States Senate). The committee uncovered transgressions by the CIA, FBI, 
and NSA, including that the NSA had monitored every overseas cable sent by an American from 
1947-75 (Johnson, L., 2004). The Church Committee increased mounting pressure for 
intelligence reform, which came in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The 
committee proposed that surveillance of communication should only be authorized through a 
judicial warrant. This recommendation became law under FISA, which established the FISA 
court to review wiretap requests (Johnson, L., 2004). The FISA court is a secret court to which 
the NSA sends its warrant requests, where they can be approved or rejected by a federal judge.  
 After FISA passed, the NSA returned to the background of government business. It did 
not receive much media attention again until the 9/11 attacks
iv
. However, the 1980s and 90s were 
a time of technological development, including new surveillance technologies, for the NSA. In 
the 1980s, the NSA made a few headlines during the trial of Ronald Pelton, an NSA intelligence 
analyst who sold secrets to the Soviet Union and compromised “Operation Ivy Bells.” William 
Casey, then-Director of National Intelligence, called for the prosecution of NBC, which reported 
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on the compromised mission (Engelberg, 1986). Though NBC was not prosecuted, Pelton was 
charged and convicted of violating the Espionage Act (Engelberg, 1986). Several other NSA 
employees were tried and convicted of selling information to the Soviet Union during this tense 
period in history
v
. These incidents show that the NSA has been concerned about leaks for much 
of its history, and the organization's relations with journalists have been tense before. 
 In the 1990s, the NSA developed the Clipper Chip, an encryption device that was 
developed with a “back door,” or security vulnerability. The NSA contended that the government 
would not listen in to conversations unless the government presented its case and  received a 
warrant, in which case it would be granted access. Privacy advocates expressed concern that 
there was potential for abuse and unchecked surveillance (Daly, 1993). The Clipper Chip plan 
generated negative press and “Big Brother” comparisons about the NSA. Though the Clipper 
Chip was abandoned by the agency in 1996, it was an indication of the NSA's focus on 
developing new technology in the name of security. The NSA was particularly concerned with 
cyber espionage during the 1990s, and warned that enemy states and terrorists could use 
advanced technology to disrupt communications (Messmer, 1997). As the agency looked toward 
the new millennium, it created goals to keep up with technological changes. For example, in 
2000, the NSA wrote in an internal report that in order to keep up with rapidly changing 
technology and threats, the agency should build a diverse workforce of contractors to respond to 
challenges, develop new access to communications of interest, and “continuously modernize the 
cryptologic system by using advanced technology” (National, 2000, p. 5). The NSA was working 
to develop new technology in the 1990s to respond to new threats. The September 11
th
, 2001 
terrorist attacks further motivated the agency to fulfill their mission.  
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Increased Surveillance Post-9/11 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11
th
, 2001 greatly impacted the NSA's operations and 
power. The NSA itself summarized that “since the 1980s, NSA had been involved in 
counterterrorism efforts, but after the 9/11 attacks, NSA and the rest of the Nation would 
examine its readiness to deal with such an unconventional enemy” (National “60
th
 Book,” 2012, 
p. 98). In 2002, President George W. Bush authorized the creation of the 9/ll Commission, an 
independent commission created to provide recommendations to prevent further terrorist attacks. 
The commission had many suggestions for government agencies, and specifically mentioned the 
NSA, saying “while the NSA had the technical capability to report on communications with 
suspected terrorist facilities in the Middle East, the NSA did not seek FISA Court warrants to 
collect communications between individuals in the United States and foreign countries, because 
it believed that this was an FBI role” (“National,” 2004, p. 87-88). Confusion about jurisdiction, 
the commission decided, led to an oversight by the NSA and other intelligence agencies. Several 
steps were taken to ensure the “readiness” to thwart further terrorist attacks. In 2001, US 
Congress passed the PATRIOT Act by an overwhelming margin
vi
. The stated goal of the act was 
to give law enforcement new tools to prevent terrorist attacks (Department of Justice). Most 
crucially to my discussion, the act relaxed the rules about surveillance. For example, the NSA 
could spy on Americans for up to seventy-two hours, while the previous limit was twenty-four, 
before going to the FISA court. The act also expanded the duration of FISA warrants, and 
attempted to make the information discovered more shareable among government agencies 
(USA Patriot, 2001). The act was controversial and produced some protests from American 
citizens. Though the PATRIOT Act made it easier for government agencies to acquire and share 
intelligence information, opponents feared that the law would lead to the acquisition of large 
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amounts of data about civilians and violate privacy (Abramson & Godoy, 2005)
vii
. 
 Another blow to the agency's reputation came in 2005, when James Risen and Eric 
Lichtblau reported that the NSA was spying on civilians without warrants. Risen and Lichtblau 
revealed in The New York Times that the NSA had been spying on Americans since September 
11
th
, 2001 without going through the FISA court at all. Americans were surprised, because 
though the NSA was expected to collect foreign intelligence, no one suspected the scope of 
information gathered on domestic targets (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005). The Bush administration 
responded by saying that the safeguards put in place over the NSA were sufficient, and the 
spying was necessary so the agency could move quickly and track terrorist threats. Officials also 
said that warrants were still required on completely domestic communication (Risen & 
Lichtblau, 2005). The article caused uproar, but no major reforms of the PATRIOT Act or NSA 
policies were undertaken. Though eventually the discussion died down, it was rejuvenated when 
Edward Snowden leaked more information several years later. This new information will be 
discussed in the following section. Risen and Lichtblau's 2005 article, and the government 
response, are also of great interest to Greenwald, who writes about the scandal extensively in 
How Would a Patriot Act?, and mentions the issue again in No Place to Hide.  
 In 2012, to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the agency's founding, the NSA 
published a historical book and timeline. Looking back at the history, Keith Alexander, the then-
chief of the organization, wrote, “while the mission to defend the Nation against all adversaries 
has not changed, the adversaries have changed considerably” (National “60
th
 Book,” 2012, p. 3). 
The NSA's focus has shifted from Axis powers during World War Two to the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, and now to terrorists and hackers post-9/11. Alexander himself wrote that 
“today our greatest threat may be a lone person using a computer,” an indication of the agency's 
latest interest in Internet surveillance (National “60
th
 Book,” 2012, p. 3). The NSA now reports 
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having over 30,000 employees, largely in their headquarters of Fort Meade, Maryland. This 
increase in staff includes a large number of contract employees, who work for outside security 
and technology companies. After the September 11
th
 attacks, the NSA received a large amount of 
funding from Congress. In an effort to keep up with increased demands for surveillance, the 
NSA announced plans to hand over support jobs to private technology companies, who competed 
for contracts (National “60
th
 Book,” 2012). This new organizational climate set the stage for 
Edward Snowden to deliver another blow to the agency's reputation. 
Edward Snowden becomes a Whistleblower  
 Edward Snowden was a hired U.S. government contractor who worked for Booz Allen 
Hamilton, a company contracted by the NSA. Concerned with what he saw as privacy violations, 
Snowden secretly copied files from the NSA. He tried to contact several journalists, asking each 
to install cryptographic systems so they could speak privately over email. One of these 
journalists was Laura Poitras. She and Snowden conversed, and he began sending her NSA 
documents to report on. Snowden also tried to reach out to Glenn Greenwald, but found him 
skeptical. Greenwald dragged his feet and simply did not find the time to install encryption 
programs. Eventually, Poitras contacted Greenwald and encouraged him to talk with a source 
about leaked documents. Together, the two flew to Hong Kong to meet their anonymous tipster 
(Greenwald, 2014).  
 In April of 2013, the journalists met with Snowden. He gave them classified documents 
related to United States surveillance programs. Holed up in his hotel room in Hong Kong, the 
journalists interviewed Snowden for hours, and he explained many of the surveillance programs 
to which the documents referred. After a week, Greenwald and Poitras began publishing articles 
about the leaks in The Guardian. The first leak reported by Greenwald and Poitras was a 
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slideshow about PRISM, a program that allows the NSA to access Americans' Google and 
Yahoo accounts (Greenwald “N.S.A.,” 2013). Later revelations exposed Boundless Informant, a 
program that allows the NSA to gather metadata from millions of telephone calls. Metadata does 
not include the content of communication, rather, it is data about that communication, including 
information about the caller's location and the amount of time spent corresponding (Greenwald 
“N.S.A.”, 2013). A third program, XKEYSCORE, was dubbed “the widest-reaching program for 
developing intelligence from the internet [sic],” because it allows NSA agents to look at online 
chats and email correspondence without going through any court to gain authorization 
(Greenwald “XKEYSCORE,” 2013). This information came as a shock, even to U.S. legislators, 
because it was commonly thought that to retrieve information, the NSA had to go through the 
FISA court (Greenwald “XKEYSCORE,” 2013). The revelation of these programs and others 
continued during Snowden's time in Hong Kong. Aside from the leaks, the reporters released a 
video of Snowden explaining his actions, thus revealing his identity to the world, on June 9
th
. On 
June 15
th
, the United States charged Snowden with a violation of the Espionage Act for 
undertaking “unauthorized communication of national defense information” and “willful 
communication of classified communications intelligence information to an unauthorized 
person” (as cited in Finn & Horwitz, 2013).  
 Reactions to Snowden varied. Internationally, many countries and political leaders 
expressed outrage at the reach of U.S. spying programs, including German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, whose personal phone was wiretapped under a clandestine program (Allam & Landay, 
2013). Central figures in the United States government incriminated Snowden. Senate Majority 
Leader Harry Reid, House Speaker John Boehner, and former Vice-President Dick Cheney each 
called Snowden a “traitor” (Cohen, 2014), and President Barack Obama stated that Snowden's 
leaks could damage U.S. security for years to come (Gerstein, 2014; Knickerbocker, 2014). 
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Conversely, some congressional leaders expressed concerns about the NSA, most notably Ron 
Wyden, a Senator from Oregon. On the Senate floor, Wyden said “These violations are more 
serious than those stated by the intelligence community, and are troubling” (Greenwald 
“XKEYSCORE,” 2013). Wyden was among several other government officials who were 
surprised by the reach of the NSA’s surveillance programs. Just as governmental leaders released 
mixed messages about Snowden, the American public was divided in their opinion. According to 
The Huffington Post, in October of 2013 fifty-one percent of Americans viewed Snowden as 
more of a hero, while forty-nine percent perceived him as a traitor (Edwards-Levy & Freeman, 
2013).  
 Facing a criminal charge and a flurry of media coverage, Snowden applied for political 
asylum, sending applications to many countries. Ecuador granted him a travel visa, but revoked 
it after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden warned the Ecuadorian president that granting Snowden 
asylum would harm relations between the two countries (Forero, 2013). Snowden then met with 
Russian diplomats in Hong Kong, and was permitted to travel through Moscow on his way to 
Cuba. However, he could not continue on to Cuba, as the U.S. canceled his passport while he 
was traveling (Radia & Bruce, 2013). Snowden then spent forty days in a transit zone of a 
Russian airport, in limbo as he waited to see if any countries would grant him entrance (Luhn, 
2013). Finally, Russia gave Snowden a one-year visa in August of 2013. After leaving the 
airport, Snowden took up residence in Russia. Since then, he has granted interviews with several 
news outlets. Throughout his ordeal, Snowden continues to speak about why he leaked classified 
documents. In August of 2014, Russia renewed Snowden's visa, granting him a three-year 
residency permit (Sonne, 2014). Snowden's leaks kept him in the public eye for an entire year, 
and coverage of his story continues. The United States and the world continue to assess his 
motives as more documents come to light. 
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Summary of Artifacts 
 Though Snowden stirred an international discussion, he himself has not written as 
prolifically about the NSA leaks as his chosen reporter, Glenn Greenwald. Greenwald's coverage 
of the NSA did not end with Snowden, and he continues to write about privacy violations. In the 
following chapters, I analyze newspaper articles written by Glenn Greenwald, as well as his 2014 
book, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, The NSA, and The U.S. Surveillance State. Between 
May and July of 2013, Greenwald wrote nine articles about the NSA and Edward Snowden for 
The Guardian. In May of 2014, he expanded upon these articles and provided new information 
in his book. Through these artifacts I seek to examine how Greenwald demonstrates the 
significance of state surveillance, and argues that surveillance is a topic worthy of discussion in 
the public sphere.  
Greenwald's articles in The Guardian  
 On Wednesday, June 5th, 2013, Greenwald published the breaking news in The 
Guardian: through a secret source he and Laura Poitras had discovered a court order which 
allowed the NSA to collect American's metadata through Verizon, one of the largest phone 
service providers in the country. The story was picked up by many other news agencies and 
shared around the web, going viral overnight. On June 6
th
, Greenwald proved that he was not 
done. He reported on PRISM, a program which allowed the NSA to access data online from 
Apple, Google, Yahoo, and other electronic communication providers. The revelations continued 
with a new article published every few days, each from a top secret NSA file. Many screenshots 
of the files were displayed in the articles themselves. On June 9
th
, Greenwald revealed Edward 
Snowden's identity, writing an article that included an interview filmed by Poitras. Greenwald 
gave Snowden's background, told the story of how he obtained so many NSA documents, and 
reiterated why these findings were significant. The articles continued, amounting to nine in all by 
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the end of July. After this, Greenwald stopped reporting about NSA documents. Though the 
news of NSA surveillance was picked up by almost every news network, Greenwald was the first 
to deliver the scoop, and provided all of the information reported by other channels.  
No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, The NSA, and The U.S. Surveillance State 
 In No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, The NSA, and The U.S. Surveillance State 
(NPTH), Greenwald talks about his meeting with Edward Snowden and the documents Snowden 
gave him. The book tells the story of how Greenwald obtained the documents, and the time 
leading up to his first Guardian publication. The title of the book comes from a quote by Senator 
Frank Church, the head of the famous Church committee which investigated NSA abuses. 
Church said that the U.S. intelligence capabilities were useful against enemies, but “we must 
know, at the same time, that capability at any time could be turned around on the American 
people, and no American would have any privacy left. Such is the capability to monitor 
everything—telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to 
hide” (Greenwald, 2006). In this book, Greenwald specifically focuses on surveillance, 
narrowing his purpose from post-9/11 security concerns to the NSA.  
 Greenwald first tells the tale of his meeting with Snowden. Though Snowden attempted 
to reach Greenwald months earlier, it was not until Laura Poitras, a documentary filmmaker, 
invited Greenwald to cover a story on the NSA that the two actually communicated. Greenwald 
tells the story of his trip to Hong Kong to meet Snowden and report on his documents. Next, he 
includes a section of documents leaked from the NSA. First, he uses the NSA's own slides to 
show that their philosophy is to “collect it all,” or as much information as possible. Then he 
discusses the repercussions of surveillance, including a loss of individualism. “What makes a 
surveillance system effective in controlling human behavior is the knowledge that one's words 
and actions are susceptible to monitoring,” he explains (p. 175). Finally, Greenwald says that the 
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mainstream media has been complicit in these abuses, and by refusing to report on them, they 
fail to perform a crucial check on the government. 
 No Place to Hide was well received by critics and became a New York Times Bestseller. 
The Los Angeles Times called Greenwald's work “a vital discussion on Snowden's revelations” 
(Ulin, 2014). Predictably, large media outlets disliked his attack on the media. Michiko 
Kakutani, reviewing for The New York Times, said “many of Mr. Greenwald’s gross 
generalizations about the establishment media do a terrible disservice to the many tenacious 
investigative reporters who have broken important stories on some of the very subjects like the 
war on terror and executive power that Mr. Greenwald feels so strongly about” (2014). I analyze 
Greenwald's book and Guardian articles in subsequent chapters.  
Literature Review 
 While the NSA scandal is a newer revelation, many scholars have focused on post-9/11 
security rhetoric. Much of this work examines President George W. Bush's rhetorical moves 
toward greater surveillance, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the passage of the 
PATRIOT Act. Scholars conclude that Bush's rhetorical framing of 9/11 allowed him to pass 
new laws and expand executive power, all in the name of defending the country against 
terrorists. Bush's strategy of preemptive war justified invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as a form 
of self-defense (Bostdorff, 2003; Dunmire, 2009), his “othering” of terrorists justified torture 
though it was not compliant with national and international laws (Johnson, R., 2002), and the 
fear of terrorists justified an increase in government secrecy (Davis & Albert, 2011; Domke et 
al., 2006). Bush's use of exigence and fear appeals also allowed him to dramatically expand 
executive power and decrease oversight of surveillance (Hasian, 2006). He spoke on behalf of 
the American people, reframing 9/11 as a war that the U.S. would win, not because it was easy, 
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but because it was the morally correct path (Johnson, R., 2002; Murphy, 2003). His focus on the 
United States as good and terrorists as evil resonated with Americans, who gave him a great 
amount of support in the immediate aftermath of the attacks (Bostdorff, 2003; Johnson, R., 2002; 
Silberstein, 2002). Scholars have found that Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric allowed him a great 
exercise of power.  
 Bush's policies themselves are also the subject of rhetorical study. Simone (2009) looked 
at the rhetoric surrounding the renewal of the PATRIOT Act, finding that the government 
justified surveillance by emphasizing individual benefit, collective welfare, danger posed by 
crime, and threats to national security. By emphasizing the threat of terrorism, the government 
was able to create a complacent citizenry which was willing to subject itself to surveillance 
(Hall, 2007). However, the use of national security to justify secrecy about government actions is 
not a new argument. Taylor (2007) traces this reasoning back to the Cold War. Taylor (2007) 
finds that nuclear deliberation is an oxymoron, and there is “a fundamental incompatibility 
between nuclear weapons and the ideals of the democratic state” (p. 671). U.S. officials claim to 
serve the interest of citizenry with nuclear development and war waging, but they simultaneously 
silence deliberation and dissenting voices. Taylor's (2007) findings about nuclear deliberation 
echo post-9/11 discussions of Bush's creation of exigence, or what Taylor calls a “permanent 
emergency,” which excuses the lack of citizen deliberation, because it takes too much time (p. 
671). Greenwald characterizes discussions about post-9/11 security in the same way, and tries to 
argue against this official silence.  
 These studies are a natural precursor to the study of security leaks, which are often 
executed in protest of governmental policies. After the increase in surveillance post-9/11, an 
aftershock of leaks of state secrets occurred. Other so-called “leakers” have been the subject of 
rhetorical analysis. Hindman and Thomas (2014) studied the mainstream media's framing of 
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WikiLeaks, concluding that the “old” media criticized the “new” as not showing proper maturity 
toward news stories. The media had to communicatively manage the tensions between the 
public's “right to know,” and the use of secrets to preserve national security. Cloud (2014) 
looked at the media portrayal of whistleblower Chelsea Manning, a transgender woman who 
leaked army documents to WikiLeaks. Cloud (2014) found that Manning failed to start a public 
conversation about security because of the “re-secreting” of the information she revealed. By 
citing her gender identity and linking it to confusion and loneliness, the government and press 
were able to invalidate her reasons for leaking information. Both Hindman and Thomas (2014) 
and Cloud (2014) focused on media framing and the debate of leaking. Greenwald, too, is part of 
the media. However, his rhetorical tactics used to introduce Snowden vary from those used by 
WikiLeaks and popular media outlets. For example, Cloud (2014) found that the mainstream 
press framed Chelsea Manning in negative terms, while Greenwald discussed the importance of 
Snowden's actions, framing him in a positive way. Hindman and Thomas (2014) found that the 
traditional media disliked WikiLeak's methods of disclosure, which often include “data dumps,” 
or large amounts of documents posted to the website with no comment. Greenwald did not 
“dump” Snowden's documents, and instead carefully read through them. In this way, he fulfilled 
more of a traditional journalistic role. There is much room for communication scholars to look at 
the media portrayal of leakers still. In Greenwald's case, I will use G. Thomas Goodnight's 
spheres of arguments and Foucault's idea of surveillance and resistance to examine Greenwald's 
rhetorical choices.  
Theoretical Lens 
Publics and Spheres of Argument 
 The public sphere. Habermas (1974) reignited scholarly interest in the public sphere. He 
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traced the history of the public to bourgeois society during the 1600 and 1700s. This group 
gained a political consciousness and began to oppose absolute sovereignty, speaking to rulers 
about their demands. Building from this historical starting point, scholars define the 
contemporary public sphere as an arena in which citizens debate public policy separate from 
state apparatuses. Asen and Brouwer (2001) characterize the public sphere as having three 
qualities: “access is guaranteed to all citizens; citizens debate openly; and citizens debate matters 
of general interest” (p. 4). In the ideal public sphere, all citizens participate as equals, resulting in 
the “bracketing” of inequalities. However, Asen and Brouwer (2001) push back on these 
assumptions, arguing, for example, that the “bracketing” of class inequality actually serves to 
hide class privilege, subsequently blocking the topic from discussion. Their reconfiguration of 
Habermas's idea posits multiple, dialectical public spheres. Asen and Brouwer (2001) also 
question the rigid separation between the state and public sphere, citing scholars who say that the 
state should be part of the public sphere, for it can ensure access for citizens. Are not legislatures 
themselves “privileged public spheres,” the authors ask (p. 15)? I will explore Greenwald's 
discussion of state involvement in the public sphere, as he pushes back against Asen and 
Brouwer's (2001) assumption that the state can ensure equal access into the debate about 
surveillance. Warner (2002) also attempts to clarify the definition of a public. He said that a 
public is self-organized, “exists by virtue of being addressed” (p. 413, emphasis in original), and 
is completely separate from the state. Though scholars have attempted to find some external 
marker of a public, Warner (2002) disagrees with these attempts, saying that publics are 
discursively constructed and called into being by being addressed. Greenwald calls an audience 
into being and characterizes their ideal concerns and behaviors, so Warner's (2002) discussion of 
the public sphere will be useful in subsequent chapters. This understanding of the public sphere 
helps illuminate Goodnight's (1982) other spheres of argument, which, I argue, are useful when 
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examining Greenwald's arguments about surveillance.  
Goodnight's Spheres of Argument 
 G. Thomas Goodnight (1982) posits three spheres in which public inquiry can occur and 
to which rhetors can appeal, and I will argue that Greenwald tries to move the debate about 
surveillance from one sphere to another. The first appeal is invoked with identification, or the 
private sphere, the second is an appeal to partisanship, which is part of the public sphere, and the 
final is an appeal to work in a special occupation, or the technical sphere (Goodnight, 1982). 
Each sphere requires different types of grounds and has different communicative norms, and 
arguments in one sphere table concerns of other spheres, which are no longer “in play” 
(Goodnight, 2012b, p. 260). Reasons put forth in the private sphere may be more casual or 
personal than they are in either other sphere, and jargon that works in the technical sphere must 
be made more familiar for the public sphere. As Goodnight quipped, “one's dentist does not have 
to be a good friend or a Democrat; just a competent dentist” (2012b, p. 260). Goodnight (1982) 
notes that the spheres are not stagnant, and what is considered an appropriate sphere for 
discussion can shift over time. He particularly highlights aspects of public deliberation, which 
occurs as the public tries to resolve uncertainty by sharing in a hypothetical construction of the 
future. Through the process of public deliberation, people create shared social knowledge in 
order to resolve shared social problems (Goodnight, 2012b). Goodnight's updated essay about 
spheres of argument focuses on deliberation, including how the groundings of an argument can 
change. This information will be useful as I examine Greenwald's attempt to change the 
groundings of arguments about surveillance. Goodnight is not the only scholar to study this shift 
in spheres of deliberation.  
 Changing groundings of arguments. Goodnight's (2012a) interest in how the grounds 
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of arguments change is especially relevant to this research, as I argue that Greenwald's rhetoric 
can be interpreted as an attempt to shift discussions of surveillance from technical reasoning to 
public deliberation. Goodnight (2012a) says that a transition from the technical to the public 
sphere can occur when experts disagree and take to public forums to fight for resources, 
leadership, and control. If the governing forums of the discipline fail to satisfy them, they may 
appeal to the public. As Goodnight (2012a) says, the arguments must then be made congruent 
with public deliberation practices. The proof and reasoning of the public sphere is more formal 
than that of personal disagreements, but less specialized than reasoning of a professional setting. 
In the public sphere, speakers will use “common language, values, and reasoning so that the 
disagreement could be settled to the satisfaction of all those concerned” (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 
202).  
 Infiltration of the technical sphere. Goodnight (1982) is concerned about the 
diminishing public sphere and the infiltration by private and technical reasoning. In particular, 
the specialization of technology has made the public sphere less accessible, because “questions 
of public significance themselves become increasingly difficult to recognize, much less address, 
because of the intricate rules, procedures, and terminologies of the specialized forums” (2012b, 
p. 225). As I will argue, Greenwald is also concerned with the infiltration of the technical sphere, 
which constrains public debates about surveillance. While revisiting his 1982 essay, Goodnight 
weighs the changes in technology. He says that on the upside, technology decreases the time and 
cost required to participate in the public sphere, but the Internet has also created “intrusions into 
privacy, government surveillance, and the refined mechanisms of a control society” (2012b, p. 
264). Greenwald, too, notes that technology, while opening new arenas of debate, also allows for 
more government surveillance.  
 Several scholars describe the technical sphere as insulated from public concerns. Hauser 
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(1987) weighs the invasion of the technical sphere, and is particularly concerned with how 
language use reflects power structures. He says that institutional rhetors “often employ a 
technical language as coin of the realm, thereby denying social actors a common sense language 
to address their common problems” (Hauser, 1987, p. 440). Several other scholars trace this 
concern using specific cases (e.g. Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Schiappa, 2012; Sovacool, 2009). 
Farrell and Goodnight (1981) noted that when an argument is contained in the technical sphere 
“its very logic precludes its practitioners from full social responsibility” (p. 296). This argument 
echoes Taylor's (2007) discussion of technical insulation within national security rhetoric. By 
containing discussions about national security within the technical sphere, Taylor (2007) argues, 
public arguments about ethics are restricted. Many communication scholars have found reasons 
to be concerned about the technical sphere's dominance of the public sphere. Greenwald 
similarly argues that ethical concerns have been suppressed through technical jargon and the 
bracketing of surveillance to the technical sphere. 
 Push back on the technical sphere. However, other scholars push back on this 
assumption, saying that simplification or under-reliance on experts is just as detrimental to the 
public sphere. Rowland (1986) found that after the Challenger Seven explosion, it appeared that 
NASA and the scientific community were at fault. However, the public put pressure on NASA to 
launch, and the technical sphere should have been listened to, rather than ignored, as experts did 
express concerns. Whidden (2012) studied debates over vaccines. She found that though 
physicians have knowledge in the technical sphere, their words are received by parents, who may 
evaluate messages based on personal sphere mantras like parental instinct. This can lead to 
public sphere consequences, like the choice not to vaccinate children, based on private, rather 
than technical, sphere reasoning. Paliewicz (2012) says that in the debate about climate change, 
the public sphere has usurped the technical sphere, invalidating good scientific arguments and 
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clouding them with economic interests. Though many studies have noted the technical push into 
the public sphere, the converse can also occur.  Goodnight (2012a) uses several examples to 
trace how the grounds of an argument may shift between the technical and public sphere, and 
finds that they often overlap. He gives the example of the environment as a topic which has 
moved from the public sphere to the technical sphere with the advent of the 1970s environmental 
movement, which lead to an interested technical field, ecology. Though arguments can move 
from the public to technical sphere, Goodnight (2012a) also says that the public may influence 
technical communities. In particular, the government influences technical discussion through 
support, which may include funding or training. “The degree to which present defense efforts 
induce scientists away from other possible avenues of research is well known,” Goodnight says 
(2012a, p. 204).  While Greenwald’s concern lies with the infiltration of the public sphere by the 
technical sphere, given the arguments made by the aforementioned scholars, I will be careful to 
consider the potential problems that might occur should Greenwald’s suggestions be followed. 
 The mass media as rhetors. Several scholars have commented on the role of the media 
in the public sphere, which Greenwald also takes on, particularly in No Place to Hide. Habermas 
tracked the changing media, which began as a news bulletin, became a member of public debate, 
and finally became commercialized, reflecting the interests of special interest groups. This move 
concerned him, because the media and the welfare state ceased to represent the role of the public 
as a whole, rather reflecting the interests of certain lobbying groups (Habermas, 1974). Bitzer 
(1987) takes a more optimistic stance, saying that the media represents the interests of the public 
by upholding rigorous professional standards and asking difficult questions to gain access to 
information otherwise inaccessible to the public. However, he is concerned about the unbalanced 
access to the public sphere, in which air time disproportionately goes to the media and the 
wealthy, making it difficult to refute mass media claims (Bitzer, 1987). Hauser (1987) also 
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concerns himself with fair access to the public sphere. He suggests that the media should 
transmit public sphere information, or “the citizenry can neither conduct intelligent discussions 
nor form balanced opinions” (p. 439). Though these articles may seem dated, Greenwald is still 
concerned with the disproportionate power of the wealthy and the technocratic elite to have 
access to the media. For Bitzer (1987), Habermas (1974), and Hauser (1987), the media was a 
new, yet essential, actor in the public sphere. Greenwald agrees, but finds that the media is not 
always a positive contributor to the public sphere in today's conversations. Just like the technical 
elite, he views the media to be too sympathetic to government surveillance. As I demonstrate, 
Greenwald criticizes the media's role in the public sphere. He finds the mainstream media's 
discussion of surveillance to be inadequate. 
Foucault, Surveillance, and Resistance 
 Greenwald's analysis of the NSA also leads him to the effects of surveillance. In many 
ways, he echoes Foucault's (1995) arguments from Discipline and Punish. Greenwald expresses 
the concern that surveillance leads to self-discipline and the censorship of dissent. He encourages 
the public to deliberate about surveillance and NSA policy as the antidote to this problem. In 
doing so, he encourages resistance at the macro-level. Previous scholarship about resistance 
often focuses on micro-practices, and, as I argue in later chapters, this is what makes 
Greenwald's rhetoric an interesting addition to this literature. 
 Foucault and the panopticon. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1995) gives a 
genealogy of the modern prison system. He is specifically interested in discipline, which he 
considers to be a technique which hones the efficiency of power. Foucault first traces the history 
of punishment through three phases: torture, humanist reform, and normalized detention. Public 
torture was once a ritual. It represented the overt power of the ruler over the citizen. However, 
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torture could lead to riots and other threats to power. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) say, 
“public executions frightened less and incited more than they were intended” (p. 147). During 
the 1700s, reformers called for criminal justice systems to punish, not take revenge. As a 
criminal breached the social contract, society had an obligation to right the wrong using 
punishment. These humanists called for a uniform standard of punishment that should be 
knowable by citizens and have the effect of deterring the crime (Foucault, 1995). Finally, in the 
late 1700s, a new shift in punishment occurred. Foucault calls this shift the normalizing of 
detention, or the birth of prisons and other total institutions with surveillance capabilities. 
 Using detention, the goal of modern-day discipline is to create docile, productive bodies 
through control. Foucault says that observation and examination are the key instruments of 
power through this technique. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) clarify that this control is achieved 
through compartmentalization of the body and complete control of space and time. Foucault 
demonstrates that modern total institutions use this technique to maintain power. He gives the 
example of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon as the ideal form of efficient control. In the 
panopticon, prisoners are perfectly observable, as they are situated around a central tower. They 
are illuminated while the tower windows are obscured, so that they could be watched at any time 
and have no way of knowing when observation occurs. The prisoner “is seen, but he does not 
see; he is the object of information, never a subject of communication” (Foucault, 1995, p. 200). 
Additionally, discipline makes power invisible while making the subject visible. The minutiae of 
everyday life is “scrupulously recorded,” in dossiers (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 159). The 
panopticon works to “induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power” (p. 201). It creates total control by making the 
exercise of power unnecessary, as the prisoner, or anyone else being surveilled, self-disciplines. 
Greenwald characterizes the NSA's surveillance as constant and overzealous. He explicitly links 
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the NSA to Foucault's discussion of the panopticon in No Place to Hide. This link demonstrates 
the seriousness of the NSA's actions, which Greenwald then uses as a warrant for resistance.  
 Microresistance. In his work, Foucault maintains that resistance is essential for power to 
operate. Through resistance, power spreads, but is also disrupted. Foucault labels some forms of 
resistance “transversal struggles” (1983, p. 211). Transversal struggles do not resist a specific 
institution or actor, but a form of power as a whole. Transversal struggles have six 
characteristics: 1) they are international, 2) they criticize power for its effects, 3) they focus on 
an immediate enemy and are anarchistic, 4) they struggle with state control over the individual, 
5) they struggle against privileges created by knowledge or secrecy, and 6) they focus on 
individual identity. Foucault (1983) labels this type of resistance as a struggle against subjection, 
or “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge” (p. 212). Several of these characteristics fit specifically with 
micro-acts of resistance, particularly the idea that resistance is anarchistic and an individual 
struggle. In these aspects, Greenwald's ideas do not necessarily fit with Foucault. However, other 
tenets, like the criticism of power for its effects, do fit well with Greenwald's suggested 
solutions. I will compare Greenwald's ideas to Foucault's definition of a transversal struggle, 
demonstrating that in this case, resistance to surveillance can occur on a larger scale coupled 
with individual actions.   
 Another form of microresistance Foucault addresses is something he calls “critique.” 
Foucault conceptualizes critique as “the art of not being governed quite so much” (1997, p. 45). 
We can undertake critique by subverting power in small ways which slightly alter relationships 
of power. Though resistance often feeds into the disciplinary power it tries to resist, through 
critique, we can make small changes. Critique gives the subject the right to question the truth and 
the relationship between truth and power (Foucault, 1997). Foucault's ideas of resistance through 
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these small critiques do fit with Greenwald's ideas for change, then, because though these actions 
do not occur on simply a personal level, they subvert power in a small way through deliberation. 
Deliberation allows us as subjects to discuss surveillance and have a say in the ways we are 
governed. 
Although Foucault’s discussion of transversal struggle and critique are useful, they do not 
go into great detail (Wendt, 1996). Communication scholars have taken up this criticism to 
continue Foucault's work by looking at resistance. However, like Foucault, most of their 
examinations look at calls for microresistance, or individual acts of resistance, while Greenwald 
asks his audience to do something much bigger: to come together as a public sphere and resist as 
a whole, or to resist on a macro-level. For example, Wendt (1996) offers a useful genealogy of 
scholarship about resistance. He gives many examples of microresistance. These include using 
the body to resist imprisonment through graffiti, piercings, and self-harm. Microresistant 
practices can also include silence (Wagner, 2012), social media use (Penney & Dadas, 2014), 
and sousveillance, or watching the watchers (Fernback, 2012). In each of these cases, resistance 
is encouraged through individual action. Groups can suggest small steps for people to take to 
resist surveillance. As noted, however, Greenwald is not as interested in individual steps. He 
encourages readers to participate in a larger-scale public sphere discussion of surveillance.  
 Macroresistance and counterpublics. Greenwald's suggestion, that the public un-
brackets surveillance by engaging in a discussion about it, is a form of macroresistance. Several 
scholars have studied macro-level resistance. Reeves and Packer (2012) suggest that protestors 
learn how to harness the media in the way police often do. By gaining media attention, resistors 
can spread their message. There is some overlap between practices of macroresistance and 
counterpublics, so counterpublics can aid in our understanding of Greenwald's messages. Fraser 
(1994) characterizes counterpublics as subordinate groups, which allow the circulation and 
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invention of counterdiscourses within the group, and express these needs to the larger public. 
Discursive contestation is necessary to determine what qualifies as worthy of public deliberation. 
Felski (1989) first characterized the feminist counterpublic as one that oscillated between 
collective identity and individual or other alliances which led to differing struggles. Similarly, 
counterpublics must oscillate between internal and external needs (Felski, 1989). Squires (2002) 
expanded on this idea, offering three responses a marginalized public can enact: enclave itself to 
avoid sanctions; create a counterpublic which debates and challenges the public; or satellite, in 
which the marginalized public engages with the wider public occasionally, but is largely self-
contained. A counterpublic can challenge public discourse while also building counterpublic 
rhetoric within the enclave. In Greenwald's case, macroresistance is very similar to the external 
role of a counterpublic. Just as a counterpublic challenges the public, Greenwald asks his readers 
to circulate a new message about surveillance which challenges the dominant discourse.  
 Many scholars have looked at identity-based counterpublics, or groups that gather 
together to challenge the majority based on the treatment of their race, gender, or sexual 
orientation (e.g. Dunn, 2010; Felski, 1989; Squires, 2002). However, Squires (2002) suggests a 
focus not on common identity but on response. The counterpublic response is one that engages 
with the public sphere in order to voice interests or persuade the public. This definition of a 
counterpublic closely parallels what Greenwald tries to persuade his audience to do. Asen (2000) 
cautions that scholars should not reduce counterpublics to persons, places, or topics as necessary 
markers. He suggests looking at collectives which are created out of recognition and articulation 
of exclusion. In Greenwald's case, then, everyone but high-up government employees and 
technicians could potentially recognize their exclusion from deliberation about surveillance. 
Who Greenwald calls on to recognize this exclusion and how he asks them to resist will be a 
subject of greater discussion.  
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 Limits of resistance. Several scholars have noted that forms of resistance can 
inadvertently support the dominant power structure. For example, a delinquent, or someone 
acting out against the dominant group, can become an example and object of knowledge for 
other subjects under the gaze of surveillance (Wendt, 1996). Thorburn (2014) found that live 
streaming video was an important form of resistance for the Occupy movement, but these videos 
could also be used by the police to watch protestors. Similarly, states can and often do regulate 
online spaces in order to control and monitor dissent (Rahimi, 2011). These studies echo Dreyfus 
and Rabinow's observation (1983) that “one of Foucault's main points is that the discourse of law 
as legitimation found a form which is still in use. He points out that even the opponent of a 
political regime speaks the same discourse regarding the law as the regime itself” (p. 131). 
Resistance still functions within dominant frameworks, which can keep it from truly succeeding. 
This may have implications for Greenwald's ideas about how to resist surveillance. Though 
Greenwald encourages public discussion, this discussion will still use the dominant framework 
set forth by the government. Greenwald's rhetoric could provide new tools and ways of thinking 
to advance the surveillance debate, but without legal change, the NSA will continue with their 
current programs.  
Precis of Chapters 
 Greenwald's reporting about the NSA is a ripe area for rhetorical study, as he attempts to 
persuade Americans and the world to be concerned about surveillance. Using Goodnight's 
spheres of argument and Foucault's discussion of discipline and surveillance as lenses, I examine 
his book and newspaper articles. In chapter two, I discuss Greenwald's characterization of the 
surveillance debate and proposed solutions. Greenwald's observations about the NSA closely 
parallel Goodnight's idea of the insulated technical sphere. Greenwald advocates for public 
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sphere discussion of surveillance. Greenwald's ideas of surveillance also draw on Foucault and 
Bentham's panopticon to explain the effects of surveillance. After analyzing these appeals, I offer 
a discussion in chapter three, examining the interaction between Foucauldian ideas of 
surveillance and public deliberation as an antidote. In chapter four, I conclude with broader 
implications for surveillance rhetoric and especially rhetoric of resistance. 
 My work contributes to the discussion about Goodnight's spheres of argument by 
demonstrating another debate in which the technical sphere has eclipsed the public sphere. 
Greenwald's coverage of the NSA does not just observe this phenomenon, it fights back to 
preserve public deliberation. While many scholars have noted that the technical sphere is 
usurping the public sphere (e.g. Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Hauser, 1987; Schiappa, 2012; 
Sovacool, 2009), Greenwald's rhetoric looks at the recognition and pushback against this 
phenomenon. This discussion contributes to Goodnight's spheres of argument through the 
examination of an attempt to move an argument from one sphere into another. Additionally, this 
study hopes to contribute to studies about resistance. Though scholars have examined personal 
acts of resistance, or microresistance, large-scale acts of resistance are typically considered only 
in the form of social movements or counterpublics. Greenwald's call for discussion functions as a 
way to resist surveillance as a public, yet at this point his work cannot be considered in terms of 
the two categories rhetoric scholars typically utilize when studying resistance. As such, this 
study can contribute to scholar's understanding of a form of resistance that is typically not 
studied, which I term resistance through the public sphere.  
                                                          
i Chelsea Manning (formerly Bradley Manning) was a U.S. Army private. In 2010, Manning began sending 
military documents to WikiLeaks, a website which compiles leaked documents. These documents became 
known as the Iraq and Afghanistan “War Logs” (Tate, 2013). Manning leaked the largest number of classified 
documents in U.S. history. Of particular note was a classified video of a 2007 military operation, in which U.S. 
soldiers gunned down a group of men from their helicopter over Iraq. It was later revealed that they were 
civilians, and two of them worked for international news companies. Other leaked documents revealed 
embarrassing diplomatic cables and mistreatment of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan (Goodman, 2011). During 
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the discussion of these leaks, Manning stepped forward and revealed that she identified as a woman, wished to 
be called Chelsea, and wanted to undergo gender reassignment treatment (Connor, 2014). In 2013, Manning was 
sentenced to thirty five years in military prison for violating the Espionage Act. This was the longest sentence 
ever handed down for leaking classified documents (Tate, 2013). Manning remains in prison, where there is an 
ongoing conflict about her gender reassignment. The military has thus far refused to provide treatment (Connor, 
2014).  
ii Julian Assange is the founder and editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, a website which publishes leaked documents and 
secret information from anonymous sources. WikiLeaks functions using the same interface as Wikipedia, 
meaning anyone can edit and contribute to the site. WikiLeaks specifically says its mission is to expose 
oppressive regimes, but “we also expect to be of assistance to people of all regions who wish to reveal unethical 
behavior in their governments and corporations” (“Wikileaks: About”). U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said 
that there was an ongoing criminal investigation into WikiLeaks in 2010 (Yost, 2010). After the Chelsea 
Manning trial and sentencing, there was some talk about prosecuting WikiLeaks, but this has not occurred.  
iii The case of Edward Snowden's NSA leaks is a focus of this paper and will be elaborated on in greater detail.  
iv Humorously, many news articles about the NSA during this time reported on the NSA's decision to ban Furby 
toys from the agency's offices. Furbys were children's toys that could repeat up to 100 words, and the NSA was 
concerned that Furbys would accidentally record and reveal secret information (Borger, 1999).  
v For a more extensive list of NSA employees accused of spying for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, see 
CNN's timeline (“Imprisoned,” 2014).  
vi The US Senate voted 98-1 to pass the PATRIOT Act, while the House of Representatives vote was 357-66 
(Department of Justice). 
vii For a more extensive list of controversies surrounding the PATRIOT Act, see Abramson and Godoy, 2005. 
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Chapter Two: Analysis 
Greenwald’s Appeals to the Public Sphere 
Greenwald explains the current NSA surveillance strategies in his articles in The 
Guardian and NPTH. Greenwald's characterizations are similar to Goodnight's definition of the 
technical sphere, or discussion which appeals to work in a special occupation (1982). 
Government officials and technical workers are part of special occupations with exclusive 
knowledge about surveillance, thus, they constitute a technical sphere. Greenwald often mentions 
these occupations, and specific actors with this knowledge, in his characterizations of the NSA. 
Additionally, Greenwald says that the discussion of the NSA's tactics has been stifled using fear 
appeals. He says that the government invokes the fear of terrorism to keep citizens complacent 
with surveillance. This idea parallels Taylor's (2007) state of “permanent emergency,” which 
allows the government to stifle public discussion because it takes too much time. Greenwald 
identifies terrorism as the permanent emergency which keeps the American public from 
discussing the NSA. After demonstrating that surveillance is confined to the technical sphere, 
Greenwald presents the solution: public deliberation. Greenwald's own writings constitute a 
move toward publicly grounded arguments, which he encourages readers to continue developing 
by participating in the public sphere. Using Goodnight's writings on the three spheres of 
argument, I analyze Greenwald's appeals.  
Surveillance and the Technical Sphere  
 In his Guardian articles and NPTH, Greenwald describes the NSA and US government 
surveillance. Using Snowden's leaked documents, Greenwald explores the NSA's motivations. 
Overall, Greenwald finds that the NSA collects information because the organization desires 
control and power. Greenwald lists members of the surveillance community, which range from 
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governments to technology companies. This elite, secluded group has similar characteristics to 
Goodnight's definition of the technical sphere, but beyond having specialized knowledge, 
Greenwald claims that the surveillance community uses their specialized knowledge to maintain 
control.  
 First, Greenwald says the NSA is insulated within the technical sphere, and the agency 
favors technical reasoning, shifting control over who makes decisions about surveillance from 
the FISA court to the NSA operatives themselves. “The vast amount of discretion vested in NSA 
analysts is also demonstrated by the training and briefings given to them by the agency,” 
Greenwald says as he reports on the FISA courts to The Guardian (2013d, p. 8). He cites a 
leaked NSA memo which instructs analysts to use their own judgment and creativity to 
determine if a target is inside or outside of the United States. Though the FISA court is supposed 
to be consulted if a surveillance target could be within the US, Greenwald says “the decisions 
about who has their emails and telephone calls intercepted by the NSA is made by the NSA 
itself, not by the FISA court” (2013d, p. 9). Though there are legal limits which keep the 
government from examining the content of these communications, “there are no technical limits 
on the ability of either the agency or its analysts to do so” (2013d, p. 9). The NSA analysts have 
specialized, technical knowledge. Here, the groundings of the argument are not legal (as 
Greenwald says the FISA court does not review the NSA's decisions), but technical, and 
insulated within the NSA. Greenwald's description of the NSA parallels Goodnight's idea of the 
technical sphere.  Goodnight (2012b) says that within the technical sphere, “technical arguments 
are stamped with procedure and rule where state of the art practice is always at issue” (p. 260). 
Greenwald similarly argues that within the NSA, technical capabilities are favored over ethical 
arguments against spying. 
 Greenwald also portrays the NSA and its partners as insulated and secretive, or separated 
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from the public sphere. Greenwald argues that the surveillance community is a revolving door of 
government officials and large defense companies who work together to produce lucrative and 
powerful results: 
The post-9/11 era has seen a massive explosion of resources dedicated to surveillance. 
Most of those resources were transferred from the public coffers (i.e., the American 
taxpayer) into the pockets of private surveillance defense corporations...Companies like 
Booz Allen Hamilton and AT&T employ hordes of former top government officials, 
while hordes of current top defense officials are past (and likely future) employees of 
those same corporations. Constantly growing the surveillance state is a way to ensure that 
the government funds keep flowing, that the revolving door stays greased (p. 168). 
Greenwald names the actors in the surveillance state frequently in his articles and book. These 
actors include high-up government officials and government contractors. He says that the groups 
work together to control information and remain insulated. 
 Large technical companies are also complacent in this surveillance, according to 
Greenwald. In his articles in The Guardian, Greenwald begins introducing these figures. In his 
first article, about PRISM, Greenwald names Microsoft, Yahoo, Apple, Facebook, Skype, and 
AOL as companies that participate in the NSA's information-sharing programs (2013a). He says 
that “collectively, the companies cover the vast majority of online email, search, video, and 
communications networks” (2013a, p. 3). In NPTH, Greenwald reflects that Snowden's 
documents reveal “a slew of secret negotiations between the NSA and Silicon Valley about 
providing the agency with unfettered access to the companies' systems” (2014, p. 112). These 
companies control a large share of online communications, and they cooperate with the NSA. 
Greenwald links the NSA together with other technical experts to demonstrate the vast power of 
the technical elite. These groups have access to most communications, and can spy on the 
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majority of online messages. This is a specialized skill unique to the technical community.  
 Greenwald also emphasizes the breadth of surveillance, and links it to the power of the 
NSA. Reflecting on the Snowden documents in NPTH, Greenwald says 
Even as someone who had spent years writing about the dangers of secrecy US 
surveillance, I found the sheer vastness of the spying system genuinely shocking, all the 
more so because it had clearly been implemented with virtually no accountability, no 
transparency, and no limits. The thousands of discrete surveillance programs described by 
the archive were never intended by those who implemented them to become public 
knowledge (2014, p. 91).  
Greenwald notes the link between power and the breadth of power. He says that the NSA 
collects a vast amount of data simply because it can. “The mere fact that it (the NSA) has the 
capability to collect those communications has become one rationale for doing so” (2014, p. 95). 
Greenwald says that the NSA uses a “collect it all” philosophy, and “the agency is devoted to 
one overarching mission: to prevent the slightest piece of electronic communication from 
evading its systemic grasp” (2014, p. 94). Not only is the surveillance community isolated, the 
community is corrupt: the NSA collects data not to prevent terrorism but to contain its power.  
Displaying many internal NSA memos and presentations, Greenwald demonstrates that the NSA 
celebrates the gathering of information, and more information is always considered better. In one 
presentation, Greenwald says, the NSA writes that XKEYSCORE is valuable because “the 
program captures 'nearly everything a typical user does on the internet'” (2014, p. 153). 
Greenwald also displays unflattering NSA memos, which demonstrate what he calls the agency's 
“ego.” He points to the title of one presentation designed internally for NSA personnel: “The 
Role of National Interests, Money, and Egos,” and says that “these three factors together...are the 
primary motives driving the United States to maintain global surveillance domination” (2014, p. 
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167). By discussing the extent of surveillance gathered, Greenwald characterizes the NSA as 
greedy—the agency grasps at data and hoards it away from the public. Using the “collect it all” 
philosophy, Greenwald gives the surveillance community, and in this case the technical sphere, a 
new connotation: the community is not just isolated because of its specializations, but because of 
its interest in power. Greenwald says the NSA has a “contemptuous and boastful spirit of 
supremacy behind them” (2014, p. 94). As Farrell and Goodnight (1981) say, arguments 
grounded in the technical sphere preclude practitioners from social responsibility (p. 296). 
Greenwald argues that the NSA is not interested in the ethics of surveillance, but solely in its 
technical capabilities to spy.  
 Greenwald furthers this characterization by discussing oversight of surveillance. He says 
that the so-called checks on surveillance are ineffective, because they, too, are shrouded in 
secrecy. Commenting on the FISA court, which issues warrants for NSA surveillance, 
Greenwald says 
The uselessness of this institution as a true check on surveillance abuses is obvious 
because the FISA court lacks virtually every attribute of what our society generally 
understands as the minimal elements of a justice system. It meets in complete secrecy; 
only one party—the government—is permitted to attend the hearings and make its case; 
and the court's rulings are automatically designated 'Top Secret' (2014, p. 128).  
Again, Greenwald demonstrates that the surveillance community is isolated from the public. No 
outside parties may review FISA rulings, and the government controls every aspect of the review 
process. Greenwald says that the FISA court is a “rubber stamp,” which only rejected eleven 
applications between 2002 and 2012, while approving 20,000 requests (2014, p. 128). By 
comparing the FISA court to standard procedure in the US justice system, Greenwald 
emphasizes the isolation of the court. The FISA court, too, is characterized as part of the 
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technical sphere. The court is run by the government and only hears arguments from the 
technical elite with access to information about surveillance.  
 Greenwald's description of the NSA and its colluding partners functions similarly to 
Goodnight's technical sphere. Goodnight describes an elite group with specific, professional 
knowledge. This community is isolated. Arguments based in public sphere appeals, like ethics 
and law, are not valued, and arguments based in technical capabilities are favored. If the NSA 
can collect information, it should, according to Greenwald's description of the “collect it all” 
philosophy. The technocratic elite move through a revolving door of government and private 
positions, which work closely with each other to share information. However, this information is 
not shared with, or explained to, the public, so that they may appraise the programs. Greenwald 
says that this secrecy is used to maintain power. Goodnight (2012) warns in his revisitation of his 
1982 essay that changes in technology can lead to “the refined mechanisms of a control society” 
(p. 264), an argument Greenwald supports by emphasizing power and control as he discusses the 
NSA.  
Creation of a Permanent Emergency 
 Greenwald also explores how the surveillance community stifles discussion. He says that 
the community draws on appeals to fear, particularly of terrorism, to keep the public complacent. 
These fear appeals confine debate to technical experts and keep debate away from the public 
sphere. This idea functions similarly to Taylor's (2007) discussion of the creation of a 
“permanent emergency” which prevents deliberation about US nuclear policy. Taylor (2007) 
says that “secrecy limits public knowledge of nuclear matters, and this limitation is in turn used 
to justify excluding an 'uninformed' public from subsequent deliberation. Additionally, “'national 
security' is commonly invoked to discourage public debate of nuclear policy on the assumption 
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that such debate might damage national security itself” (p. 173). Greenwald attributes squelched 
discussion to claims of national security as well, and asserts that these claims are unjustified. 
 First, Greenwald says that surveillance advocates have repeatedly cited prevention of 
terrorism as justification for the NSA's power. “The post-9/11 American veneration of security 
above all else has created a climate particularly conducive to abuses of power,” Greenwald 
writes as he introduces his encounter with Snowden (2014, p. 2). In NPTH, Greenwald says 
“Surveillance cheerleaders essentially offer only one argument in defense of mass surveillance: it 
is only carried out to stop terrorism and keep people safe. Indeed, invoking an external threat is a 
historical tactic of choice to keep the population submissive to government powers... Ever since 
the 9/11 attack, US officials reflexively produce the word 'terrorism'” (2014, p. 202). Linking 
surveillance to a powerful fear appeal, like terrorism, keeps citizens complacent, according to 
Greenwald. Greenwald says the government often claims there is a need for secrecy surrounding 
these programs in order to protect national security. “Every time a lawsuit is brought contesting 
the legality of intercepting Americans' communications without warrants, the Obama DOJ raises 
claims of secrecy, standing and immunity to prevent any such determination from being made,” 
he writes in an article for The Guardian (2013d, p. 5). Taylor (2007) says that the US 
government often cites the need for secrecy and exigency as reasons to limit public discussion on 
nuclear weapons. Post-9/11, the Bush administration linked these arguments to rogue states and 
terrorists (Taylor, 2007). Greenwald says that the threat of terrorism is invoked to keep 
surveillance away from public scrutiny. The threat of terrorism, along with the secrecy of 
proceedings previously discussed, allow the government to maintain the state of permanent 
emergency with little evidence of the effectiveness of surveillance.  
 Greenwald, however, finds these claims to be exaggerated. He says, “What is perhaps so 
remarkable about the bottomless exploitation of the threat of terrorism is that it is so plainly 
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exaggerated. The risk of any American dying in a terrorist attack is infinitesimal, considerably 
less than the chance of being struck by lightning” (2014, p. 205). Greenwald finds that 
statistically, the threat of terrorism is low. Responding to the argument that the NSA could 
prevent the next 9/11, Greenwald says “the implication is rank fearmongering and deceitful in 
the extreme” (2014, p. 204). He points out that the CIA had several reports about al-Qaeda 
before 9/11, but failed to act on the warnings. Therefore, collecting more information will not 
solve the intelligence problems (2014). Additionally, revealing NSA programs does not threaten 
national security. When writing his first article based off of Snowden's documents, Greenwald 
says he contemplated any threats to national security, but believed “the idea that 'terrorists' would 
benefit from exposing the order [to authorize Boundless Informant] was laughable: any terrorists 
capable of tying their own shoes would already know that the government was trying to monitor 
their telephone communications” (2014, p. 66). Greenwald argues that the fear of terrorism is 
overblown, and that reporting about the NSA would not harm national security because terrorists 
are already on guard against surveillance. Greenwald also says that many NSA programs are not 
being used to prevent terrorism. Greenwald says that “a substantial number of the agency's 
activities have nothing to do with antiterrorism efforts or even with national security. Much of 
the Snowden archive revealed what can only be called economic espionage” (2014, p. 134). This 
refers to NSA documents that revealed economic spying on foreign energy companies. This 
spying takes place in order to “gain enormous advantage for American industry” by providing 
economic and trade information, which the NSA has supplied to the State Department and others 
during negotiations with other countries (2014, p. 138-139). Greenwald argues that terrorism is 
an exaggerated threat, and is not the sole motivation for NSA surveillance. These arguments call 
into question the NSA's main justification for their unchecked power. Greenwald makes the first 
move toward dismantling the technical sphere isolation of surveillance by claiming that 
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arguments in favor of this isolation are invalid. The creation of a permanent emergency stifles 
public discussion, keeping surveillance within the realm of technical deliberation. Greenwald 
thus spends time dismantling the illusion of the constant threat of terrorism, which he sees as 
created to protect and expand governmental power.  
Moves Toward Publicly Grounded Arguments 
 After characterizing the current state of surveillance, Greenwald says that average 
Americans should begin to discuss the government's policies. This can be viewed as a call to 
move the debate into the public sphere. Greenwald bases his arguments in public (not technical) 
appeals, particularly by talking about ethical concerns and the impact on democracy. Greenwald 
demonstrates the significance of the leaked information and frames public deliberation as the 
appropriate public response to this information. Throughout his writings, Greenwald changes the 
groundings of arguments about surveillance. While he previously characterized the debate as 
confined to technical appeals requiring specialized knowledge, jargon, and questions of 
capability, he now uses public appeals. These appeals use common language and center around 
questions of ethics. 
 Greenwald makes the case for public deliberation by arguing that Snowden's leaked 
documents are significant, and Snowden wanted the leaks to be discussed by the public. He 
describes Snowden as brave, and says that the leaks can change the course of United States 
history. These portrayals tell the public to view the leaked documents as serious and worthy of 
discussion. Greenwald says that Snowden “will go down in history as one of America's most 
consequential whistleblowers, alongside Daniel Ellsberg and Bradley Manning. He is responsible 
for handing over material from one of the world's most secretive organisations [sic]—the NSA” 
(2013b, p. 1). Snowden's motivations for leaking these documents, Greenwald says, were “a 
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belief in the dangers of government secrecy and pervasive spying; I instinctively recognized his 
political passion” (2014, p. 14). Greenwald also quotes Snowden's own explanation of why he 
leaked the documents. Snowden said “I want to spark a worldwide debate about privacy, Internet 
freedom, and the dangers of state surveillance” (2014, p. 18). Greenwald first demonstrates the 
significance of the leaks in his articles in The Guardian, and then expands on Snowden's 
motivations in NPTH. He links these motivations to public discussion and knowledge of 
surveillance. 
  Surveillance as a public problem. First, Greenwald links surveillance to its effects on 
democratic freedom, and thus the public as a whole. “Even absent abuse, and even if one is not 
personally targeted, a surveillance state that collects it all harms society and political freedom in 
general,” Greenwald says (p. 201). “Everyone,” he argues, “even those who do not engage in 
dissenting advocacy or political activism, suffers when that freedom is stifled by the fear of 
being watched” (p. 201). Greenwald's specific discussion of the effects of surveillance will be 
discussed in the following section. For now, Greenwald's concern with freedom creates a 
question of ethics about surveillance. By using the value of freedom, Greenwald is able to link 
this problem to public concerns. Goodnight says that “deliberative rhetoric is a form of 
argumentation through which citizens test and create social knowledge in order to uncover, 
assess, and resolve shared problems” (2012a, p. 198). Greenwald first demonstrates that the NSA 
is a shared social problem that does not just affect outliers, because it impacts freedom as a 
whole. Goodnight (2012a) outlines the many changes that occur when an argument moves from 
the technical to public sphere. Most importantly, he says, “the interests of the public realm—
whether represented in an appropriate way or not—extend the stakes of argument beyond private 
needs and the needs of special communities to the interests of the entire community” 
(Goodnight, 2012a, p. 202). Greenwald argues that the entire community, and not just 
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individuals being watched, suffers the consequences of surveillance. He does so by pointing to 
public values that are compromised by surveillance.  
 Greenwald also shows that this is a public problem by focusing on the breadth of 
information acquired, and emphasizing that this information is collected from “average” citizens. 
In Greenwald's first article published about the leaks, he says that “The document shows for the 
first time that under the Obama administration the communication records of millions of US 
citizens are being collected indiscriminately and in bulk—regardless of whether they are 
suspected of any wrongdoing” (Greenwald, 2013a, p. 2). Greenwald furthers this argument in 
NPTH, saying, “Initially, it is always the country's dissidents and marginalized who bear the 
brunt of the surveillance, leading those who support the government or are merely apathetic to 
mistakenly believe they are immune” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 3). This shows that many people 
could be impacted by surveillance and average citizens are being surveilled. Greenwald makes 
arguments like this to demonstrate that many people have been impacted by the NSA and 
unchecked surveillance. “The perception that invasive surveillance is confined only to a 
marginalized and deserving group of those 'doing wrong'--the bad people—ensures that the 
majority acquiesces to the abuse of power and even cheers it on,” Greenwald says (2014, p. 182). 
However, Greenwald says, the government watches many people for reasons beyond terrorist 
threats or illegal activity. He gives examples from history, saying that Martin Luther King Jr., the 
civil rights movement, and environmentalists have all been placed under government 
surveillance. Greenwald says that in the government's eyes, these people were doing something 
wrong, they were engaging in “political activity that threatened the prevailing order” (2014, p. 
183). His argument clashes with a common argument by surveillance advocates: that those who 
are doing nothing wrong should not be concerned, because they are not being watched. 
Greenwald attacks the idea that “privacy is for people who have something to hide” (2014, p. 
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171). He emphasizes the scope of NSA surveillance, and links it to ordinary citizens, which 
refutes this argument. Because all citizens are impacted by surveillance, Greenwald can start to 
move toward his main argument: that debates about surveillance should occur in the public, not 
technical, sphere. 
  Shifts from technical jargon to public appeals. Greenwald mentions his concerns about 
the technical aspects of surveillance and how to make these appeals to the public. He writes 
I knew from many years of writing about NSA abuses that it can be hard to generate 
serious concern about secret state surveillance: invasion of privacy and abuse of power 
can be viewed as abstractions, ones that are difficult to get people to care about 
viscerally. What's more, the issue of surveillance is invariably complex, making it even 
harder to engage the public in a widespread way. (2014, p. 19) 
This shows that Greenwald attempted to draw the public's attention to this issue, but 
acknowledged technical aspects as barriers. Goodnight says that in the public sphere, “the forms 
of reasons would be more common than the specialized demands of a particular professional 
community” (2012a, p. 202). In a public forum, “speakers would employ common language, 
values, and reasoning so that disagreement could be settled to the satisfaction of all concerned” 
(2012a, p. 202). Greenwald uses some of these tactics as he writes about the NSA.  
Greenwald employs common language to explain technical issues. For example, Greenwald 
explains technical terms, like metadata, and what they could be used for, in order to explain the 
effects of surveillance to the American public. He often makes the argument in the articles and 
his book that metadata is invasive. In his article about Boundless Informant, which allowed the 
NSA to collect metadata in bulk from major cell phone service providers, Greenwald says 
“[metadata's] collection would allow the NSA to build easily a comprehensive picture of who 
any individual contacted, how and when, and possibly from where, retrospectively” (Greenwald, 
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2013c, p. 3). He gives another example of this in NPTH:  
Listening in on a woman calling an abortion clinic might reveal nothing more than 
someone confirming an appointment with a generic-sounding establishment...But the 
metadata would show far more than that: it would reveal the identity of those who were 
called. The same is true of calls to a dating service, a gay and lesbian center, a drug 
addiction clinic, an HIV specialist, or a suicide hotline (Greenwald, 2014, p. 133).  
From metadata, Greenwald says the government can “create a remarkably comprehensive picture 
of your life, your associations, and your activities, including some of your most intimate and 
private information” (2014, p. 133).  Greenwald explains metadata using common language. 
Further, he uses specific examples that demonstrate the effects of surveillance. Greenwald begins 
arguing that surveillance is invasive by defining terms and programs and providing common 
examples. Writing about the technical sphere, Hauser (1987) says that technical discussions often 
“employ a technical language as coin of the realm, thereby denying social actors a common 
sense language to address their common problems” (p. 440). Greenwald takes this technical 
language and starts supplying his readers with common language and examples, so that they can 
participate in the discussion. These moves show the shift in argument groundings from the 
insulated technical sphere to the more open public sphere.  
 Emphasis on multiple voices. Greenwald also moves the groundings of the surveillance 
debate by making it just that—a debate. He writes about the variety of voices discussing 
surveillance, which demonstrates that surveillance is more than just a technical talking point. In 
his early articles for The Guardian, Greenwald does this by quoting many technical experts, 
government voices, and special interest groups. In his first article for The Guardian, revealing 
the program PRISM, Greenwald takes statements from several US senators, including Ron 
Wyden, who Greenwald says raised concerns about surveillance for years before the leaked 
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documents came to light (2013a). Greenwald also takes statements from Jameel Jaffer, the 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Center for Democracy. Jaffer said that 
“the military has been granted unprecedented access to civilian communications” (Greenwald, 
2013a, p. 6). Greenwald quotes public figures who state their concern about the effects 
surveillance could have on the public. These statements contrast with quotes from government 
officials, which are left without commentary. In his articles in The Guardian, Greenwald airs a 
variety of voices so that readers may begin to engage in the debate.  
  Greenwald also moves the debate into the public sphere by revealing information 
to which the government and technology companies must respond. For example, in NPTH 
Greenwald tells the story of writing an article for The Guardian about PRISM. He says that NSA 
documents showed that technology companies cooperated with the NSA, but the companies 
denied this when contacted. When deciding what to do, Greenwald chose to write both 
statements into his story: 
'Let's not take a position on who's right. Let's just air the disagreement and let them work 
it out in public,' I proposed. Our intention was that the story would force an open 
discussion of what the Internet industry had agreed to do with their users' 
communications; if their version clashed with the NSA documents, they would need to 
resolve it with the world watching, which is how it should be (2014, p. 76).  
This move parallels one way that Goodnight (2012a) says that technical arguments become 
public. If a technical argument becomes unreconcilable, “both groups may take to the public 
forum governing the technical community's business, each contesting for leadership and control 
of scarce resources. If one side or the other is dissatisfied with the verdict, then the boundaries of 
the special community are in jeopardy, as disgruntled advocates appeal to a more general public” 
(p. 202). Greenwald forces this eruption of appeals to the public by reporting that technology 
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companies are cooperating with the NSA. Because these reports damage technology companies' 
reputations, they must respond to their consumer base, or the public.  
 As Goodnight (2012a) says, “An arguer can accept the sanctioned, widely used bundle of 
rules, claims, procedures and evidence to wage a dispute. Or, the arguer can inveigh against any 
or all of these 'customs' in order to bring forth a new variety of understanding... In the variety of 
argument endeavors, this tension is expressed by attempts to expand one sphere of argument at 
the expense of another” (p. 200). Greenwald challenges the sanctioned forms of argument about 
surveillance. Using common examples mixed with technical evidence, he expands the argument 
into the public sphere at expense of the technical. Goodnight (2012b) says that “arguments 
engage social change when the systems of authority embedded in spheres not only fail to provide 
resolution but the expectations themselves (as implicit norms, conventions of propriety, or 
explicit rules) become part of the debate” (p. 260). Greenwald makes the technical sphere rules 
part of the debate by explaining the value of citizen deliberation. He presents the public with 
options, which serve as the antithesis to the NSA's secrecy, or lack of options, for public 
participation in their programs. Using these strategies, Greenwald moves arguments about 
surveillance out of the technical sphere and into the public sphere. Greenwald also discusses the 
effects of surveillance in more detail, and calls the public to resist surveillance. These appeals to 
privacy look less at the actors, or the technical sphere, and more at the surveillance apparatus 
itself.   
Greenwald's Use of Foucauldian Ideas of Surveillance 
 Using Foucault's ideas of control and the Panopticon, Greenwald furthers his case that the 
public must rally to change the NSA's policies. Greenwald cites Foucault himself in NPTH. He 
only discusses the Panopticon briefly, but his appeals function similarly to Foucault's in several 
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ways. Greenwald often notes the irony of a surveillance apparatus that sees all but cannot be 
seen. Making this point, he begins to introduce his idea of an antidote to surveillance: public 
discussion. Greenwald addresses the public sphere, in which he includes average citizens, US 
politicians, and the press.  
Surveillance and the Panopticon 
 Greenwald says that the NSA's “secrecy creates a one-way mirror: the US government 
sees what everyone else in the world does, including its own population, while no one sees its 
own actions” (2014, p. 169). The idea of a one-way mirror sounds similar to the Panopticon, 
which Greenwald introduces to readers of NPTH several pages later. He first explains the 
physical plan for the panopticon—a large, central guard tower surrounded by a circle of rooms, 
which would allow for monitoring. The inhabitants of the rooms would not be able to see into the 
guard tower, and would be unable to determine when they were being watched. Greenwald says 
that “those who believe they are watched will instinctively choose to do that which is wanted of 
them without even realizing that they are being controlled...with the control internalized, the 
overt evidence of repression disappears because it is no longer necessary” (2014, p. 176). Due to 
the omnipresence of the tower, “they would thus act as if they were always being watched, even 
if they weren't” (2014, p. 175). Greenwald introduces readers to Bentham and Foucault's ideas in 
NPTH. He explains the concept of the Panopticon in common language, just like he explained 
technical terms in common language.  
 After explaining the concept of the Panopticon, Greenwald spends time proving that 
surveillance affects our actions. In NPTH, he argues that people act differently when they are 
under surveillance. Greenwald cites Foucault's writings in Discipline and Punish, saying that 
Foucault writes about the Panopticon as a powerful tool because “this model of control has the 
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great advantage of simultaneously creating the illusion of freedom. The compulsion to obedience 
exists in the individual's mind” (2014, p. 176). Greenwald brings theoretical support to his idea 
that surveillance stifles free expression by showing that people self-discipline when they are 
being watched. He links this effect to self-censorship, which is harmful to a democratic society. 
Foucault (1995) writes in Discipline and Punish that “He [sic] who is subjected to a field of 
visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (p. 203). 
Subjects of surveillance discipline themselves, so that overt constraints need not be in place for 
the subject to obey. Similarly, Greenwald says that because we are aware of surveillance, we shy 
away from controversial thoughts or actions. The government does not need to punish us to 
maintain power, because surveillance leads subjects to discipline themselves.  
 Using Bentham and Foucault, Greenwald finally gets to the center of what makes the 
surveillance state problematic. By concealing the surveillance apparatus within the technical 
sphere, concerns about publicly based appeals—like ethics—are bracketed. In Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault (1995) says that observation and gaze are key instruments of power. Greenwald 
explains this in simpler terms as he characterizes the current state of surveillance. Identifying 
observation as a mechanism of power, he can next turn to encourage a public that engages in 
surveillance issues and watches the watchers. His appeals to public discussion function as a 
large-scale form of resistance against surveillance.  
Resistance to Surveillance 
 Greenwald calls the public to resist on two levels: he asks readers to undertake small 
changes to resist surveillance on a micro-level, but he also calls for a larger discussion. These 
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larger acts of resistance include deliberation, legal reform, and a change for the role of 
journalists. Though “macro” level resistance is not typically discussed from Foucault's writings, I 
argue that Greenwald's large-scale changes do fit with some of Foucault's characterizations of 
resistance. The interplay between these microresistances and larger acts allow for a new reading 
and understanding of Foucault's idea of resistance by linking resistance to the public sphere.   
 Calls for personal resistance. First, Greenwald asks readers to take personal steps to 
resist surveillance. These strategies fit with microresistance strategies typically extrapolated from 
Foucauldian ideas of disciplining the body, or what Foucault calls “transversal struggles”. 
Greenwald says that “individuals also have a role to play in reclaiming their own online privacy. 
Refusing to use the services of tech companies that collaborate with the NSA and its allies will 
put pressure on those companies to stop such collaboration and will spur their competitors to 
devote themselves to privacy protections” (2014, p. 252). Individuals can boycott large 
technological companies which give information to the NSA and instead choose other service 
providers. “Additionally, to prevent governments from intruding into personal communications 
and Internet use, all users should be adopting encryption and browsing-anonymity tools...and the 
technology community should continue developing more effective and user-friendly anonymity 
and encryption programs,” Greenwald suggests (2014, p. 252). Greenwald offers readers two 
small steps they can take to resist surveillance. These steps are against an immediate enemy, like 
the technological companies that cooperate with the NSA, and occur on a personal level, both of 
which parallel Foucault's idea of the transversal struggle (1983). Transversal struggles, according 
to Foucault (1983), are small acts of resistance to a form of power as a whole. Transversal 
struggles are critical of power for its effects, anarchistic and immediate, and struggle with state 
control of individuals. Through small personal steps, people can resist surveillance and protect 
their individual privacy. Though these microresistance tactics are mentioned briefly, they are 
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only a small part of Greenwald's ideas for resisting surveillance, most of which focus on the 
public sphere. 
 Public Sphere Resistance  
 Based on these critiques, Greenwald identifies several actors who can change US 
surveillance policies: the public, the government, and journalists. As discussed above, the first 
group Greenwald calls on is the public, which he encourages to deliberate to resist surveillance. 
Greenwald reminds his audience that “it is human beings collectively, not a small number of 
elites working in secret, who can decide what kind of world we want to live in” (2014, p. 253). 
However, aside from average citizens, who can come together to discuss surveillance, 
Greenwald also names special actors within the public sphere. In the epilogue of NPTH, 
Greenwald says that Snowden's leaks  
triggered the first global debate about the value of individual privacy in the digital age 
and prompted challenges to America's hegemonic control over the Internet. It changed the 
way people around the world viewed the reliability of any statements made by US 
officials and transformed relations between countries. It radically altered views about the 
proper role of journalism in relation to government power. And within the United States, 
it gave rise to an ideologically diverse, trans-partisan coalition pushing for meaningful 
reform of the surveillance state (p. 248).  
These changes stem from the public sphere, and occurred through public discussion. Greenwald's 
“trans-partisan coalition” can be conceived of as a public, which he calls into being as he 
addresses this group in NPTH.  
 Greenwald's created public. Warner (2002) encourages scholars to frame publics 
discursively, saying they exist “by virtue of being addressed” (p. 413). Greenwald calls a 
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concerned public into being throughout NPTH, often by discussing his readers as a collective 
“we.” Greenwald's created audience is concerned about surveillance, and willing to take public 
action to advocate for reform. Greenwald emphasizes the choice readers can make with 
Snowden's leaked NSA documents. He says that Snowden's leaks can create a new discussion 
about surveillance, or they can fade due to public apathy. In the introduction to NPTH, he writes 
That's what makes Snowden's revelations so stunning and so vitally important. By daring 
to expose the NSA's astonishing surveillance capabilities and its even more astounding 
ambitions, he has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic 
crossroads. Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms 
that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of 
omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the 
past? Right now, either path is possible. Our actions will determine where we end up. 
(2014, p. 6). 
Greenwald gives the audience two choices and links their actions to the two potential paths. In 
this way, he begins the process of public deliberation, which Goodnight (2012a) describes as a 
momentary pause in which we examine political paths, both taken and untaken. “As deliberation 
raises expectations that are feared or hoped for, public argument is a way to share in the 
construction of the future,” he says (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 198). Greenwald shares his 
interpretation of the choice the public must make with this information. He projects two 
alternative futures based on the public's deliberation about privacy. This shared future is 
emphasized through his use of the words “our,” “everyone,” and “we,” which link readers 
together as the American public. Greenwald's projected paths put the decision into the readers' 
hand, emphasizing the public's ability to act and intervene in technical surveillance. Through 
invitations to deliberate, Greenwald addresses his readers as part of a public sphere.  
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 Greenwald also argues that deliberation is an effective way to resist surveillance and curb 
surveillance abuses. Greenwald offers an example from his own life. He says he first learned of 
the power of deliberation when he heard from Laura Poitras, another journalist who accompanied 
him on the trip to Hong Kong. She said that she had been detained in airports dozens of times as 
a result of her writing and filmmaking. Greenwald covered the interrogations of Poitras in a 
Salon article, which received substantial attention. In the months afterward, Poitras was not 
detained again. In NPTH, Greenwald writes “The lesson for me was clear: national security 
officials do not like the light. They act abusively and thuggishly only when they believe they are 
safe, in the dark. Secrecy is the linchpin of abuse of power, we discovered, its enabling force. 
Transparency is the only real antidote” (2014, p. 12). Greenwald generalizes this example to 
other abuses of power. He says that power without deliberation is “the ultimate imbalance, 
permitting the most dangerous of all human conditions: the exercise of limitless power with no 
transparency or accountability” (2014, p. 169). Greenwald presents public deliberation as the 
solution and antithesis to surveillance, which he calls for the public to undertake. After 
addressing readers as members of this public, Greenwald names special actors within the public 
sphere who can also help to effect change.  
 Government reform. First, Greenwald says the government must make changes in order 
to curb abuses from the NSA, and that readers should pressure the government to do so. 
Greenwald says that public branches of the government do not have enough control over the 
NSA. Giving examples of reform that occurred after his reporting, Greenwald says that he and 
Snowden were pleased by a bipartisan bill introduced to US Congress. This bill proposed 
defunding the NSA, which was “by far the most aggressive challenge to the national security 
state to emerge from Congress since the 9/11 attacks” (2014, p. 249). The bill did not pass, but 
only by a small margin, which Greenwald portrays as a hopeful sign of reform. Additionally, 
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Greenwald suggests “converting the FISA court into a real judicial system, rather than the one-
sided current setup in which only the government gets to state its case, would be a positive 
reform” (2014, p. 251). Greenwald's suggestions for change go beyond individual acts to put 
pressure on government policy reform. By reforming the FISA court, the secrets of the NSA 
would be public knowledge. Though Greenwald writes about power from a Foucauldian 
perspective, he proposes large acts of resistance to the public problems created by surveillance in 
addition to small acts to resist the discipline of individual bodies. These ideas are compatible 
with Foucault's (1997) idea of critique, however, which he defines as  “the art of not being 
governed quite so much” (p. 45). Greenwald asks the audience to resist through public sphere 
discussion in order to negotiate the way they are governed. He argues that discussion through the 
public sphere can alter power relations between citizens and the US surveillance state.  
 Though the government is considered completely separate from the public sphere by 
many scholars (Habermas, 1974), others push back on this idea (e.g. Asen & Brouwer, 2001). In 
the case of the NSA, other government branches are considered members of the public by 
Greenwald. Greenwald notes that many congressional members were unaware of the tactics used 
by the NSA, including spying on Congress itself (2014). For these reasons, Greenwald 
specifically calls on Congress to be part of the solution. This should occur through legislative 
reform spurred by public pressure. Greenwald's summoned public addresses politicians as well 
as average citizens.  
 Journalism as the fourth estate. Similar to his arguments about government reform, 
Greenwald critiques US journalism, which he says should be more active in the fight against 
state surveillance. First, Greenwald says that journalists have been too complacent about 
government secrecy in the past. He says that “especially since 9/11 (though before that as well), 
the US media in general had been jingoistic and intensely loyal to the government and thus 
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hostile, sometimes viciously so, to anyone who exposed its secrets” (2014, p. 79). Greenwald 
says that the press has failed to report important leaked information because of their loyalties to 
the US government. This intense loyalty gets linked to the “creation of a permanent emergency” 
after 9/11 (Taylor, 2007). The culture of US journalism is also to blame in Greenwald's eyes. 
“The culture of US journalism mandates that reporters avoid any clear or declarative statements 
and incorporate government assertions into their reporting, treating them with respect no matter 
how frivolous they are,” he writes (2014, p. 55). This acquiescence prevents the press from doing 
their intended job: providing a check on the government. Greenwald claims that “the US media 
has frequently abdicated this role, being subservient to the government's interests, even 
amplifying, rather than scrutinizing, its messages and carrying out its dirty work” (2014, p. 210). 
Greenwald says that journalists have been complacent in government secrecy, especially since 
9/11. 
 Journalists are also being prosecuted more frequently for revealing state secrets, a trend 
that Greenwald portrays as extremely harmful to the public sphere. Greenwald draws on his own 
experiences since reporting Snowden's leaked documents. Greenwald talks about being labeled a 
blogger, lawyer, or something other than a journalist, by reporters. According to Greenwald, “the 
media in full then got into a debate about whether I was in a fact a 'journalist' as opposed to 
something else. The most commonly offered alternative was 'activist'” (2014, p. 212). He says 
that “the designation had real significance on several levels. For one, removing the label of 
'journalist' diminishes the legitimacy of the reporting. Moreover, turning me into an 'activist' 
could have legal—that is, criminal—consequences” (2014, p. 212-213). Greenwald discusses the 
significance of this labeling because of the current climate of government persecution of leaks. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) had recently secretly acquired the Associated Press's telephone 
records, and had prosecuted Fox News journalist James Rosen for not revealing the identity of a 
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source. By labeling Rosen as a co-conspirator to the source, the DOJ was able to compromise his 
journalistic protection. The DOJ decided, Greenwald says, that “working with one's source to 
'steal' classified information was beyond the scope of the 'reporter's job'” (p. 215). Creating 
boundaries on what counted as “legitimate reporting,” the DOJ was able to prosecute a journalist. 
That the press labeled Greenwald as something other than a journalist could have legal 
consequences for his reporting. The press has been complacent in US surveillance, and doing so 
has impacted their freedom to report on information. Habermas (1974) expressed concern that 
the press was moving away from servitude to the public sphere and toward special interests. 
Greenwald also expresses concerns about the failure of the US press to provide a check on the 
government, but links this to a governmental abuse of power.   
 Greenwald links this trend to the government's desire to retain their power to spy. He says 
that after he reported on the Snowden story for The Guardian he was afraid to travel to the US 
because the government might “concoct a theory that the supposed crimes I had committed were 
outside of the realm of journalism” (2014, p. 220). Greenwald brings this up to prove again that 
the government wants to suppress dissent. “The government was no doubt desperate to punish 
someone for what had been called the most damaging leak in the country's history, if not to 
alleviate institutional rage, then at least as a deterrent to others,” he writes (2014, p. 220). 
Greenwald shows that the American press is too complicit to the government's abuses, and the 
government is desperate to retain its power. These privileges are kept in place by US journalists.  
  Finally, Greenwald calls journalists to action. He says  
The idea of a 'fourth estate' is that those who exercise the greatest power need to be 
challenged by adversarial pushback and an insistence on transparency; the job of the 
press is to disprove the falsehoods that power invariably disseminates to protect itself. 
Without that type of journalism, abuse is inevitable (p. 230).  
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He attacks the idea that journalists need to be objective, saying all news articles serve interests, 
and “the relevant distinction is not between journalists who have opinions and those who have 
none, a category that does not exist. It is between journalists who candidly reveal their opinions 
and those who conceal them, pretending they have none” (2014, p. 231). Greenwald encourages 
reporters to be honest about their opinions, and to strive for advocacy. He says that “from the 
United States' founding, the best and most consequential journalism frequently involved 
crusading reporters, advocacy, and devotion to battling injustice” (2014, p. 231). Greenwald 
frames his advocacy for surveillance reform as part of a reporter's duties. Greenwald supports the 
idea of the journalist's role in democracy, encouraging journalists to contribute information 
critical to public decision-making in the public sphere.  
  Greenwald's suggestions that politicians and journalists aid public deliberation fit with 
those of public sphere scholars. Bitzer (1987) conceives of the politicians and journalists as key 
actors in the public, because they have access to information that the public may not. After 
practicing rigorous inquiry to access this information, journalists should encourage 
communication which weighs truths, and determines courses of action as a public. Greenwald 
also focuses on the role of journalists, who are an essential tool for public deliberation. Similar to 
Hauser's (1987) idea that that media were a crucial new actor within the public sphere, 
Greenwald explains the importance of journalists as a check on surveillance power. Greenwald's 
addressed public includes average US citizens, politicians, and journalists. He argues that these 
groups should provide a check on government surveillance, which can occur through 
deliberation in the public sphere. Though Greenwald suggests several personal acts of resistance 
for readers to undertake, he spends much more time advocating for public discussion.  
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Chapter Three: Discussion 
 Greenwald's writings contribute to the studies of surveillance rhetoric and resistance by 
communication scholars. In this instance, public deliberation is conceived of as resistance to 
surveillance. Surveillance, in Greenwald's eyes, disciplines the body and democratic thought 
as a whole. In the past, scholars have focused on microresistance, which is small, personal and 
daily, but Greenwald conceives of a larger idea of resistance to that same form of power which 
disciplines the body. Surveillance harms democracy, therefore resistance must occur on a 
larger level. Greenwald encourages the public sphere to deliberate about surveillance, thereby 
denying the technical community the power that comes along with secrecy.  
 This case also has implications for the practices of journalism and whistleblowing. The 
NSA leaks have been called the largest leaks in the history of the US, and their success at 
starting a conversation should be analyzed. Greenwald avoids common pitfalls that are used to 
discredit leaked information using journalistic tactics to frame Snowden and the leaks. He 
must also grapple with being discredited himself, as other journalists sometimes labeled him in 
a way that excluded him from the profession. Greenwald also works to disprove that the US 
lives in a state of permanent emergency because of the threat of terrorism, as this rationale is 
used to suspend public deliberation. I first analyze the implications of the current study for 
work on the public sphere and resistance to surveillance, before moving on to implications for 
journalism and whistleblowing. Finally, a critique of Greenwald's rhetoric is offered.  
Implications for the Public Sphere and Resistance 
 The study of Greenwald's rhetoric contributes to current literature on Goodnight's three 
spheres of argument and Foucauldian ideas of resistance. Greenwald's proposed solutions use 
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the public sphere to resist surveillance. These ideas clash because of competing practices 
within the United States, which functions both as a surveillance state and a democracy with an 
active public.  
 Public deliberation of previously technical arguments. Greenwald's rhetoric is an 
example of shifting the groundings of an argument from the technical to public sphere, even as 
he argues for readers to undertake this shift. Greenwald's Guardian articles and NPTH are 
examples of how arguments move from the technical to public sphere. Greenwald avoids 
technical jargon and explains technical concepts to move appeals from the technical to public 
sphere. Greenwald also uses public appeals, particularly to ethical concerns. Greenwald 
questions how surveillance power impacts democracy and freedom of expression. These 
concerns were bracketed in the technical sphere, which, Greenwald says, was only interested 
in the technical capability to “collect it all.” Greenwald's rhetoric constitutes a shift in 
argumentative groundings. This rhetoric is an example of a debate moving from technical to 
public appeals.  
 Scholars have looked at technical arguments being brought to the public (e.g. 
Paliewicz, 2012; Rowland, 1986; Whidden, 2012), but Greenwald's NSA debate differs from 
these cases by focusing more on concerns about technical capability than scientific knowledge. 
Many of these cases have looked at examples of the public misconstruction of scientific 
evidence, for example in debates about vaccination, NASA space shuttle launches, and climate 
change. On one hand, Greenwald's case could be viewed in this light, particularly from the 
NSA's perspective. When Guardian editors went to meet with US government officials, the 
officials said that The Guardian did not understand the context of the documents they wanted 
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to publish (2014). In the NSA's eyes, then, The Guardian was misconstruing technical 
arguments, much like Whidden's (2012) observation that the public misconstrued technical 
evidence in favor of vaccines.  
 However, from Greenwald's perspective, this is not an example of the public debating 
topics that should be left to technical communities, but of deliberate cover-up by a technical 
community. The NSA debate differs from previous research about Goodnight's spheres 
because the concerns bracketed are political and ethical questions about democratic practices. 
Greenwald expresses concern that surveillance harms democracy, and thus the public sphere, 
by suppressing dissent. Greenwald's debate calls into question the “sanctioned, widely used 
bundle of rules” within the technical sphere of argument (Goodnight, 2012a, p. 200) by 
insisting that the public should participate in debates about government surveillance. 
Greenwald is not asking readers to assess scientific inquiry, but technical capability by the 
state.  
 Greenwald's concern focuses on state participation in an isolated technical sphere. This 
case differs from previous examples of technical-public sphere overlap, which several scholars 
have studied (e.g. Paliewicz, 2012; Rowland, 1986; Whidden, 2012). Rowland (1986) studied 
the Challenger Seven disaster, and found that though the technical community (NASA) 
ignored safety warnings, the public and press were also responsible for pressuring NASA to 
launch the shuttle. The shuttle launch had technical aspects, but was still a matter of public 
concern and policy. Similarly, NSA surveillance is tied to public problems, like terrorism, but 
is achieved through technical means. The justification for surveillance fits within the realm of 
public argument. Rowland (1986) encouraged scholars to see the public and technical spheres 
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as overlapping, and finds that in the Challenger Seven accident, competing experts helped the 
public to judge expert opinion in the aftermath. Greenwald can be viewed as a competing 
expert, with experience in law and surveillance. He has built his critique of the US government 
over the span of his career, and continues this discussion in NTPH. Greenwald has specialized 
knowledge, but uses it to include the public sphere in the conversation about surveillance. 
 While other scholars (Paliewicz, 2012; Whidden, 2012) have found that public 
arguments eclipse legitimate scientific arguments, this is not the case in the NSA debate, 
which combines technical and public concerns. Greenwald uses his own expertise to bring the 
debate to the public, and foregrounds public concerns like “what ought to be done” not “what 
can be done” (Rowland, 1986, p. 139). Greenwald's NSA debate is a specific type of public-
technical overlap that is becoming more common as the government engages in surveillance 
with the help of technical contractors. This case contributes to work about the public and 
technical spheres by demonstrating a subject area that is both public and technical, and 
showing the tensions that these competing value systems create. In the next section, I discuss 
how Greenwald attempts to push the surveillance debate into the public sphere, and uses the 
public sphere to resist technical bracketing of ethical appeals.  
 The public sphere as resistance. The resistive subject Greenwald calls into being 
would be an active public sphere participant who questions the surveillance state through 
public discussion. Though this subject would take small steps to preserve online privacy, 
Greenwald spends much of NPTH explaining broader solutions to surveillance. NPTH 
constitutes an attempt to use the public sphere to resist NSA surveillance.  
 Resistance literature has often focused on small ways to resist surveillance power. 
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Foucault focuses on personal, transversal struggles against surveillance power, because 
surveillance power stems from compartmentalization and control over the body. The body is 
“approached as an object to be analyzed and separated into its constituent parts,” forging the 
creation of a docile, useful subject (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 153). As a result, struggles 
against this control are often anarchistic, immediate, and focused on the individual (Foucault, 
1983). Greenwald acknowledges this effect, and argues that surveillance leads to the internal 
suppression of dissenting thoughts as a result. However, Greenwald does not advocate for just 
a small, personal solution to this control over the body. 
 Greenwald's appeals are an example of using the public sphere as a form of resistance 
to surveillance. Though this idea differs from acts of microresistance, Greenwald's suggestions 
still fit with Foucauldian ideas of resistance, and show how the public sphere can play a part in 
that resistance. Greenwald argues that citizens can engage in public deliberation to negotiate 
with the surveillance state. This echoes Foucault's idea of “not being governed quite so much,” 
or critique (1997, p. 45). Foucault (1997) says that critique is based on several anchoring 
points, including universal rights. The act of critique asserts that the subject does not want to 
accept laws because they are unjust. Critique asks “What are the limits of the right to govern?” 
(Foucault, 1997, p. 46). People may engage in critique to negotiate the way they are being 
governed if they find the rules of governance to be contrary to natural rights. Greenwald 
encourages critique through public deliberation about the limits of the surveillance state. He 
draws on American values like political freedom and freedom of expression, thus using 
American rights as a basis for critiquing surveillance. Greenwald's call to action echoes 
Foucault's idea of critique.  
Rice 58 
 
 Greenwald's ideas also run parallel to Habermas's functions of the public sphere. 
Greenwald's solution is similar to the way Habermas (1974) describes the bourgeois public 
sphere, which was a medium through which private needs were communicated to the state. A 
key demand of this bourgeois public was that they “opposed the principle of supervision—that 
very principle which demands that proceedings be made public” (p. 52). This group was 
concerned with private autonomy and the restriction of state power to a few areas. Thus, 
Habermas argues that the public sphere can be used to negotiate private freedoms. This 
becomes the link between the public sphere and Foucauldian ideas of surveillance: using the 
public sphere, citizens can collectively negotiate to be governed less. Greenwald demonstrates 
that the NSA's surveillance is a public problem, calling on the American public to deliberate 
about the future of surveillance. 
 Greenwald links this solution to personal control, however, by explaining how 
surveillance impacts our individual thoughts and actions. In these ways, his solution does fit 
with some of Foucault's ideas of a transversal struggle, namely that his solution struggles with 
state control over the individual and critiques power for its effects (Foucault, 1983). 
Greenwald (2014) says that “people radically change their behavior when they know they are 
being watched” (p. 173) as he demonstrates the effects of surveillance power. He then links 
these behavioral changes to the suppression of free speech, saying that “mass surveillance kills 
dissent in a deeper and more important place as well: in the mind” (2014, p. 177-178). 
Greenwald argues that surveillance power controls the individual and critiques power for its 
effects. Though Greenwald is encouraging a public debate, he claims that this debate will help 
negotiate surveillance power that creates control over individual bodies, thus drawing on some 
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of Foucault's ideas of resistance as he talks about the public sphere. 
 This solution demonstrates the tension between the surveillance state and the 
democratic republic, as Greenwald wrestles with the US as both a security state and a 
democracy. He ponders this contradiction as he explains the panopticon, saying  
Democracy requires accountability and consent of the government, which is only 
possible if citizens know what is being done in their name. The presumption is that, 
with rare exception, they will know everything their political officials are 
doing...conversely the presumption is that the government, with rare exception, will not 
know anything that law-abiding citizens are doing. That is why we are called private 
individuals, functioning in our private capacity. Transparency is for those who carry 
out public duties and exercise public power. Privacy is for everyone else (2014, p. 
209).  
The fact that the NSA knows more about US citizens than citizens know about the agency 
poses challenges to this model of government. As a result, Greenwald encourages the exercise 
of democratic rights to combat surveillance. The public sphere has the capability to put 
pressure on government officials and demand surveillance reform. Greenwald asks us to resist 
using the public sphere. This solution arises as a result of the rhetorical situation, which pits 
privacy against security. Greenwald encourages the audience to select privacy. He spends time 
deescalating the permanent emergency of terrorism to demonstrate that NSA surveillance is 
abusive and unnecessary, and then appeals to values which support public deliberation.  
 Public deliberation can be viewed as a form of resistance through Greenwald's rhetoric. 
Though many scholars have looked at microresistance to surveillance power, Greenwald asks 
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the public to resist through deliberation, which he considers an antidote to surveillance. This 
solution grapples with the contradiction of the US as surveillance state and the US as a 
democracy. The public sphere will continue to discuss these competing values, sharing in 
alternative projections of the future (Goodnight, 2012a). Greenwald encourages the public to 
create a shared vision of a state with transparency in the public sphere and privacy for citizens.  
Implications for Journalism and Whistleblowing 
 Greenwald's rhetoric also has implications for the practices of journalism and 
whistleblowing. Though he argues that journalists should do more to question the US 
surveillance state, he finds himself constrained by journalistic expectations. These lead to a 
debate over the boundaries of journalism and how to portray whistleblowers.  
 Greenwald as journalist or advocate. Greenwald's critique of the media offers 
another path of resistive action for special actors within the public sphere. The media serves 
the public sphere by spreading information, as Habermas (1974) says, “in a large public body 
this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and 
influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, radio and television are 
the media of the public sphere” (p. 49). Greenwald's critique of the media calls for the media 
to uphold their public sphere function and transmit information, even state secrets, for public 
deliberation. However, differences between Greenwald's Guardian articles and NPTH show 
that even though Greenwald says journalists should be advocates, he himself is constrained by 
journalistic expectations. 
 Greenwald's writings in The Guardian fulfill less of an advocacy role than his writings 
in NTPH. Greenwald's newspaper articles often: 1) explain information about surveillance 
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programs in common language, 2) quote various organizations' standpoints and knowledge 
about the programs and, 3) explain why these revelations are significant (e.g. they demonstrate 
that the NSA concealed programs, they demonstrate that Americans are being spied on without 
a court warrant). Importantly, many of Greenwald's stronger advocacy claims, like the 
argument that the NSA functions as a panopticon, are not mentioned until NPTH. Other 
functions of the book include: 1) demonstrating the negative private effects of surveillance, 2) 
linking surveillance to the compromise of democratic ideals, and 3) suggesting possible 
solutions. Though Greenwald encourages journalists to provide a check on the government and 
advocate for change, his claims are tempered in his own newspaper articles. Greenwald 
discusses this directly as he talks about trouble publishing with The Guardian throughout 
NPTH. Greenwald prepared his first story about BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, but was told 
that The Guardian editors would have to meet with their lawyers before publishing. Publishing 
US government secrets, he was told, could be considered a crime under the Espionage Act. 
The Guardian agreed to consult with the government to demonstrate that they did not intend to 
harm national security. Greenwald waited impatiently in Hong Kong for three days as his 
editor conferred with Guardian lawyers. He considered leaving and publishing the documents 
independently, but admits that “doing it alone, without institutional protection, would be far 
riskier” than publishing with a large newspaper (2014, p. 69). Though Greenwald says 
journalists should be stronger critics of the US government, he himself struggled with 
institutional and journalistic constraints as he reported the NSA stories.  
 Greenwald calls himself a journalist throughout NPTH, but the press debated this label. 
Greenwald was called everything from a journalist to a blogger to an advocate. As Greenwald 
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explains, these terms could have legal consequences for him. Several scholars (Bitzer, 1987; 
Hauser, 1987) name journalists as special actors within the public sphere, who have the ability 
and duty to provide the public with information essential to decision-making. However, 
Hindman and Thomas (2014) find that today journalists engage in professional boundary-
marking, labeling “new” media members as non-journalists through terms like “blogger.” In 
Greenwald's case, the press reacted similarly, sometimes distancing him from the profession in 
their reporting. The implications of this debate are ongoing and challenging for journalists. 
The Obama administration has prosecuted more whistleblowers than any administration before 
it, and has started to go after journalists who publish this information by naming them as co-
conspirators (Shane, 2010). Greenwald is right to say that labeling him as an outsider could 
have legal consequences for him. Greenwald's rhetoric demonstrates an increasingly difficult 
climate for journalists who report on leaks. This climate is reenforced by other journalists.  
 Effectiveness of the leaks. Greenwald's reporting about the NSA also begs the 
question: why did these leaks receive more coverage than others? Several low-profile leaks of 
NSA documents have occurred since 9/11, but none have received the coverage that Edward 
Snowden's documents received
viii
. Additionally, leakers like Chelsea Manning have revealed 
information about other clandestine programs to some response, but none as widespread as the 
Snowden leaks. Greenwald himself ponders the effectiveness of the leaks, and finds that 
Snowden's methods refute some preexisting arguments about leakers. Although Greenwald 
and Snowden wished to challenge the surveillance state, to do so they complied with some of 
the norms of US journalism. Greenwald also attempts to demonstrate that the leaks will not 
harm US security, another argument often voiced by the government after leaks.   
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 First, Snowden insisted on leaking the documents to reporters, who could use their 
“journalistic judgment” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 53) to decide which documents to publish. 
Greenwald (2014) explains that Snowden did not want to publish the documents in bulk, a 
strategy used by Chelsea Manning and WikiLeaks, because working with reporters would 
“allow the public to process the revelations in a more orderly and rational way” (p. 53). 
Snowden insisted that Greenwald and other reporters select documents to publish based on the 
public interest, which would not allow the US government any arguments that the documents 
“endangered lives” (p. 53). Hindman and Thomas (2014) found that the traditional media 
disliked WikiLeak's methods of disclosure, which often included dumping large amounts of 
secret information onto the website with no commentary. The media also criticized “new” 
media, like WikiLeaks, for being immature and rash in their leaks of sensitive information. 
Greenwald did not “dump” Snowden's documents, and instead carefully read through them. He 
describes the process of vetting and deliberating about which documents to publish in NPTH. 
In this way, Greenwald fulfilled a more traditional journalistic role.  
 Snowden, Greenwald, and others involved in the NSA leaks were very careful to 
publish documents in a way that portrayed Snowden positively, as a past tactic to discredit 
whistleblowers has been to point out character flaws. Greenwald writes that upon meeting 
Snowden, he found him rational and likeable, and that “the two most favored lines of whistle-
blower demonization--'he's unstable' and 'he's naive'--were not going to work here” (2014, p. 
31). Cloud (2014) writes similarly that Chelsea Manning was discredited as a whistleblower 
using the arguments that Manning was an enemy of the state, or that Manning was sexually 
confused and seeking attention. In response to these typical attempts at discrediting 
Rice 64 
 
whistleblowers, Greenwald discusses Snowden's character in The Guardian and NPTH. He 
reports on Snowden's motivations for leaking the documents, and his hope that the public 
discusses the documents to preserve democratic transparency and the right to privacy. These 
characterizations refute that idea that Snowden is an enemy of the state. Some journalists did 
attempt to discredit Snowden along gendered and sexual lines
ix
, an area ripe for study in this 
case. However, on whole, Greenwald and Snowden worked together to display transparency 
about Snowden's character and motivations. Greenwald mentions Snowden's calm disposition 
and intelligence as he describes him in The Guardian and NPTH. Though the media still 
questioned Snowden's character, Greenwald's preemptive efforts to describe Snowden may 
have prevented this discussion from taking hold, as it did in the case of Chelsea Manning.  
 Past scholarship on leakers has found that the press often invalidates or, to borrow a 
term from Cloud (2014), “re-secrets” leaked information by attacking the credibility of the 
source or journalist responsible. Greenwald grapples with these challenges and explains the 
strategies he and Snowden used to avoid such accusations in NPTH. The practical implications 
for journalists and whistleblowers are that taking care while presenting the whistleblower's 
image is essential to leaking information. Even as Greenwald critiques the US press, he must 
portray Snowden carefully to create a debate about the NSA documents. Based on previous 
research, Greenwald did this in a more successful way than other whistleblowers and 
journalists. As a result, Greenwald (2014) writes that “the effects of this unfolding story have 
been far greater, more enduring, and more wide-ranging than we ever dreamed possible” (p. 
249).  
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Disproving the Permanent Emergency 
 An additional factor that could contribute to the effectiveness of the NSA leaks is 
Greenwald's effort to downplay the threats leaks cause to US security. Greenwald emphasizes 
in The Guardian articles and NPTH that the NSA leaks will not harm national security. He 
tries to disprove that the US exists in a “permanent emergency” that calls for the suspension of 
citizen deliberation because of threats to security (Taylor, 2007). Since 9/11, the US 
government has invoked the threat of terrorists to justify greater government secrecy (Davis & 
Albert, 2011; Domke et al., 2006). Hasian (2006) found that President George W. Bush's use 
of fear appeals allowed him to greatly expand surveillance power. Bush also invoked familiar 
binary oppositions reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric, invoking rogue terrorist states to justify 
military force and surveillance (Taylor, 2007). Taylor (2007) identifies four “fault lines” 
within the public which are sites of rhetoric and resistance about nuclear policy: secrecy, 
centralization, repression, and distortion. Though Taylor (2007) identifies these fault lines as 
places of rhetoric and resistance, he specifically focuses on rhetoric from the nuclear 
community. I argue that Greenwald's arguments exemplify the use of these themes as tools for 
resistance, and that these fault lines are applicable to surveillance rhetoric.  
 Secrecy. Greenwald frames secrecy of the surveillance community as problematic and 
anti-democratic. The rhetoric of nuclear weapons includes a demand for extreme secrecy 
which suppresses circulation of information to the public (Taylor, 2007). The public is denied 
information necessary to make informed decisions, and this lack of knowledge is then used to 
justify excluding the public from debate about nuclear weapon policy (Taylor, 2007). 
Greenwald identifies similar problems which exclude the public from discussions of NSA 
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surveillance. As discussed in chapter two, Greenwald says the NSA conducts surveillance in 
total secrecy without any transparency or public oversight. He highlights the secrecy of NSA 
surveillance tactics and portrays secrecy as undesirable, because it leads to an abuse of power. 
Next, Greenwald contrasts NSA secrecy with the openness of the public sphere. Thus 
deliberation is framed as the antithesis and solution to secrecy. Taylor (2007) focuses on the 
rhetoric of the nuclear weapons community and finds that they cite a need for secrecy. 
Similarly, Greenwald takes the NSA's demand for secrecy and encourages resistance against it. 
 Centralization. Taylor (2007) finds that another key aspect of nuclear rhetoric is an 
emphasis on centralized knowledge and decision-making. Using centralization, the technical 
elite control information about nuclear information and make decisions without the public 
(Taylor, 2007). Greenwald's portrayal of the NSA as insulated, along with Goodnight's idea of 
the technical sphere, fit with the idea of centralization. Taylor (2007) says that technical elites 
are not interested in civilian control of the nuclear program, and emphasize their duty as 
“guardians” or “stewards” of the US nuclear weapon program. Contrasting this idea of 
stewardship, Greenwald's take on centralization attributes this argument to ego and power 
within the surveillance community. He first demonstrates that the NSA is insulated in its 
decision-making, and then reveals unflattering documents in which the NSA brags about this 
power. Greenwald's explanation of the reasons for centralizing US surveillance demonstrate a 
resistive reading of centralization, not as necessary to national security, but as vain and 
corrupt. This encourages the public to decentralize surveillance information and include more 
voices in the decision-making process. Greenwald exemplifies this move by quoting multiple, 
public voices as he discusses the NSA, which acts in defiance of centralization.  
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 Repression. Third, Taylor (2007) says officials invoke repression of dissent through 
civil liberties. The nuclear state demands consensus and will discipline any threats to its order 
(Taylor, 2007). Nuclear weapon rhetoric attempts to contain the public sphere and reduce 
deliberation (Taylor, 2007). Similarly, Greenwald argues that Post 9/11, the government has 
suppressed dissenters using the panopticon, which creates self-censorship. After arguing that 
the government uses surveillance to suppress dissent, Greenwald asks his readers to resist. He 
calls for resistance through civil liberties, especially the freedom of speech and press. 
Greenwald critiques the NSA for its desire to repress civil liberties, and the natural solution to 
this is to continue using the public sphere and civil liberties to resist government surveillance.  
 Distortion. Taylor (2007) finds that nuclear rhetoric often employs distortion of threat 
levels and threat exaggeration to suppress deliberation. The insulated nuclear elite profits from 
the generation of public anxiety, which helps to preserve technocratic autonomy over nuclear 
decision-making (Taylor, 2007). Similarly, Greenwald critiques the US surveillance 
community for inflating the threat of terrorism to suppress discussion. Greenwald responds to 
this rhetorical situation by addressing the fear of terror head on. He argues that surveillance is 
used on US citizens (2013a; 2013d; 2013e), and that surveillance is being used to suppress 
dissent, bolster US egos, and gain economic advantages in trade (2014). Terrorism is not the 
main motivator or target for US surveillance, and the threat of terrorism should not lead to 
public exclusion from the discussion. Greenwald identifies the distortion of threats as one way 
the US government retains surveillance power, and works to disprove this argument.  
 Greenwald's rhetoric provides an example of the use and appropriation of surveillance 
rhetoric for resistive purposes. Taylor (2007) identifies these four fault lines as opportunities 
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for resistance as well as themes of official nuclear rhetoric. Greenwald's appeals to resistance 
echo these four themes as critiques of the surveillance state. Greenwald highlights and argues 
against secrecy, centralization, repression and distortion of NSA surveillance policies.  
Greenwald argues that there is power in knowledge of NSA surveillance and tactics, and he 
labels NSA tactics for readers. Greenwald's identification of NSA strategies are similar to 
Taylor's (2007) four rhetorical themes of nuclear rhetoric. However, Greenwald's rhetoric 
provides an example of the use of these themes to generate modes of resistance for the public 
sphere.  
 Leaks without a reporter, like the Manning leaks or WikiLeaks, do not identify and 
argue against surveillance rhetoric, because they come without commentary. Greenwald 
responds to the permanent emergency and encourages the public sphere to deliberate anyway. 
Greenwald fulfills a more journalistic role as he reports the NSA leaks, and his argument 
against the permanent emergency may have encouraged the public to discuss the leaks. 
Greenwald's arguments may have contributed to the success of the Snowden leaks over other 
leaks in the past because of his arguments against the permanent emergency.  
Critiques of Greenwald  
 Greenwald's rhetoric emphasizes the importance of the NSA leaks and provides readers 
with some solutions to state surveillance, however, the arguments are not perfect. I argue that 
Greenwald's present choices to the public are extreme, forcing the public to choose between 
two polar-opposite futures. Additionally, Greenwald's solution may be inaccessible to readers, 
and perhaps there are better solutions to temper the NSA's surveillance. 
 America's future as a false dilemma. Greenwald invites readers to imagine two 
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possible futures based on their actions after the NSA leaks, but these options are extreme and 
limiting. He asks “Will the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms 
that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of 
omnipresent monitoring and control, beyond the dreams of even the greatest tyrants of the 
past?” (2014, p. 6). Greenwald's visions of a shared future are at either extreme of the 
spectrum, and may not be accurate portrayals of the choice the American public faces. 
Goodnight (2012b) notes both the positive and negative of changing technology and public 
deliberation, saying that the digital age leads to “the reduction of cost and time for message 
distribution” and “intrusions into privacy, government surveillance, and the refined 
mechanisms of a control society” (p. 264). He encourages scholars to engage in critical inquiry 
as revolutions in communication create upheaval in all spheres of argument. Goodnight 
encourages a nuanced view which examines the unsettling of conventions—both good and 
bad—in 21
st
 century communications. Greenwald does not engage in these nuances, instead 
casting the NSA as extreme, abusive, and ineffective.  
 Presenting readers with two extreme options may undermine Greenwald's efforts to 
promote change. As Greenwald sees it, readers must either band together and reform 
surveillance entirely, or they must suffer under tyranny. Two years after Edward Snowden's 
leaked documents, the dramatic overhaul Greenwald envisioned has not occurred. Does this 
mean that small changes in US surveillance policy are worthless? Greenwald's suggestions 
may give readers the idea that without public sphere debate, small acts of resistance are 
ineffective and therefore not worth undertaking. This may be implied by the time Greenwald 
allocates to solutions. He mentions briefly several steps readers can take personal, but then 
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allocates two chapters to public acts of resistance that can occur through public discussion.  
 Erosion of the public sphere. Greenwald's solutions beg another question: does the 
public care about privacy? According to Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook founder, the answer is 
no, or at least that people are getting more comfortable with less privacy over time (B. 
Johnson, 2010). Greenwald does not seem to operate under this assumption, and argues that 
even though people say they don't care about privacy, they do. He says he asked a friend who 
claimed to not care about privacy to give him access to all of his online passwords, and the 
friend refused (2014). Through this extremely limited anecdote, Greenwald argues that 
everyone cares about privacy. This anecdote is similar to the extreme solutions Greenwald 
presents: though the vast majority of the public may not be willing to give out our passwords, 
that does not necessarily mean the same majority is opposed to broad collection of metadata. 
Greenwald ignores nuances within the privacy debate as he presents this anecdote. Greenwald 
insists that the public has a right to privacy, but his appeals may be ineffective if he has 
misjudged public opinion. Though most Americans would (in Greenwald's eyes) refuse to put 
video cameras in their home or give away their online passwords, they remain split on the uses 
of surveillance, as will be discussed in the following section.  
 Additionally, use of the public sphere to address privacy concerns may be ineffective 
because of the decline of the public sphere. Habermas (1974) expressed concern about the 
erosion of the public sphere by special interests and technical groups, and these barriers may 
make the public sphere an ineffective solution to surveillance. As Warner (2002) says, a public 
exists by virtue of being addressed. Greenwald, then, addresses every American citizen as part 
of that public. However, this address may be too broad to create any actual change. 
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Greenwald's rhetoric does not demand a social movement or a counterpublic, which could test 
ideas in an insulated community before challenging the public. Rather, he asks that all 
Americans band together to deliberate about surveillance.  
Aftermath of the Leaks  
 The aftermath of the NSA leaks demonstrate slight progress and potential for reform, 
but overall, these changes have been slow. Internet companies have fought to save their 
reputation after Greenwald exposed their cooperation with the NSA, and some, like Google 
and Facebook, now notify users of surveillance requests. Google especially has been active in 
the petitioning and lobbying of the government to change surveillance policies (Timm, 2014). 
Many companies have increased security service to protect ordinary user data, including 
Yahoo (Timm, 2014). 
 Legal reform has been slow. Several bills have died in Congress, including one to 
defund the NSA altogether (Ackerman, 2014). Most prominently, the USA FREEDOM Act, 
which sought to end bulk collection of telephone records, passed the US House of 
Representatives. In late 2014, the Senate voted not to take up discussion of the bill during their 
session, but the bill could be discussed in 2015 (Savage & Peters, 2014). In late 2013, 
President Obama appointed a special committee to recommend changes to the NSA. The 
committee consisted of many former White House staff members and security officials, and 
recommended 46 changes to the NSA, including that phone companies keep call records, but 
not release them unless the NSA applies for a warrant (Nakashima & Soltani, 2013). Obama 
said he would take this recommendation and transition to a system in which the NSA does not 
retain bulk metadata from phone calls (Nakashima & Soltani, 2013), and announced the 
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reform official in March 2014 (“The White House,” 2014). One year after Greenwald's first 
Guardian article about the NSA, however, The Guardian reported that ceasing the collection 
of phone records was the only reform the Obama administration had undertaken (Ackerman, 
2014). In courts, judges have ruled against NSA practices. One judge ruled that the collection 
of phone records was unconstitutional, and another granted a defendant access to information 
gathered against him under the FISA court (Timm, 2014). Though some reforms have been 
undertaken, the sweeping changes Greenwald hoped for have not occurred. Again, this leads to 
a critique of his extreme choices. If a massive overhaul of the surveillance state has not 
occurred, Greenwald implies, US citizens will be subject to extreme tyranny. This would make 
Greenwald's vague suggestions for personal reform useless, as they do not protect privacy in a 
wide-reaching way, which is what Greenwald spends the most time attempting to solve.  
 Small, personal reform, on the other hand, seems to have occurred for some American 
citizens. According to the Pew Research Center, 87% of Americans surveyed were at least 
“somewhat aware” of surveillance programs after the Snowden leaks, and of that group, 36% 
had taken steps to increase their privacy online (Rainie & Madden, 2015). These steps include 
avoiding certain applications, changing passwords, and changing privacy settings on social 
media. However, of this 36%, very few knew about common tools to protect privacy, like PGP 
(pretty good privacy) email encryption, search engines which do not record history, and web 
browser plug-ins which prevent online trackers from recording data (Rainie & Madden, 2015). 
Much of the Pew's research data focused on personal behavioral changes. However, 61% of 
those surveyed said that after the NSA leaks they were not confident that surveillance served 
the public interest (Rainie & Madden, 2015). Overall, Snowden's leaks had some impact on the 
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American public, which overall displays less confidence in government surveillance. 
Additionally, a small portion of the public is now taking small steps to protect online privacy. 
These changes are of interest because Greenwald did not focus on small steps Americans can 
undertake. Though Americans are more aware and are now trying to protect privacy, their 
attempts to do so are ineffective against government surveillance, and they still demonstrate a 
lack of knowledge about how to prevent surveillance of their online activities.   
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
 Greenwald's rhetoric in NPTH and The Guardian launched a massive conversation 
about NSA surveillance. His writings add to the rhetorical study of surveillance and security, 
specifically in the wake of 9/11.  
Implications for Public Sphere Scholarship   
 Greenwald's case is itself an example of the groundings of argument shifting between 
Goodnight's three spheres of argument. Greenwald employed several tactics to move 
surveillance toward publicly-based appeals. These include demonstration of public effects, 
explanations of technical jargon, and the inclusion of multiple voices in the surveillance 
debate. Greenwald drafts proposed solutions which would engage US citizens, the US 
government, and journalists. Notably, these solutions focus on these groups rather than 
technical communities with the technical capabilities to alter surveillance practices. Thus, 
Greenwald refuses to contain surveillance within the technical sphere and instead encourages 
the public to deliberate. This example adds to previous case studies of overlap between the 
technical and public spheres of argument. Previous scholarship has often focused on the 
eclipse of the public sphere by the technical (e.g. Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Hauser, 1987; 
Schiappa, 2012; Sovacool, 2009). Greenwald's case is an example of pushback on this 
infiltration, and shows that just as arguments can become insulated within the technical sphere, 
they can also be removed and placed back into the public. Journalistic activism may be an 
important part of this move, and will be discussed in a subsequent section.  
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Implications for Foucauldian Ideas of Surveillance 
 The key finding from Greenwald's case is that the public sphere can be used as 
resistance to surveillance power, though this solution may not satisfactorily solve the 
overreaches of surveillance power. Greenwald links Foucauldian ideas of surveillance to the 
NSA, and then poses the solution of public deliberation. The public sphere may be a strong 
form of resistance against surveillance because of the incompatibility of the technical values of 
surveillance with the public sphere: if, as Greenwald says, the NSA is successful in retaining 
its power because it is secret, a public sphere discussion strips away the NSA's power by 
removing its secrecy. Central tenets of the public sphere include public access and openness 
(Asen and Brouwer, 2001), and central tenets of surveillance power include public 
inaccessibility and technical closure. By framing surveillance as at odds with the public 
sphere, Greenwald makes the argument that only through the public sphere can we resist 
surveillance on a large-scale. Greenwald's rhetoric bridges the theoretical gap between public 
sphere scholarship and Foucault's idea of surveillance power, demonstrating how these 
conflicting values may overlap in ways that are productive for resistance.  
 One critique of Greenwald's rhetoric is that NPTH focuses on the problems of 
surveillance power but does not delve into the specifics of the solutions. Perhaps if Greenwald 
had allocated more time to specific, personal acts his readers could undertake to resist 
surveillance, these ideas would have gained even more traction. Though Greenwald conceives 
of the public sphere as resistance, perhaps more “traditional” modes of resistance, like social 
movements and counterpublics, would have created a stronger identified audience for 
Greenwald's rhetoric. However, his arguments is that surveillance impacts all US citizens, so 
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calling for specific identity-based groups or social movements is incompatible with 
Greenwald's own argument.  
Implications for Journalism, Activism, and Resistance  
 Journalists play an important role in the display of leaked information, and Greenwald's 
case contributes to rhetorical scholars' limited studies of this process. Other scholars have 
found that “new media” or data dumps are framed as reckless breaches of national security 
(Cloud, 2014; Hindman & Thomas, 2014). Greenwald represents the most successful and high 
profile reporting of leaked information after 9/11. His navigation of common accusations 
against leakers has been successful for several reasons: 1) the debunking of the national 
emergency, 2) an emphasis on journalistic discretion, and 3) a careful portrayal of the agent 
who leaked information.  
 First, Greenwald spends much time demonstrating that the public sphere has time to 
deliberate about national security. Previous scholarship demonstrates that an emphasis on 
exigency has given the state great control of national security information (Davis & Albert, 
2011; Domke et al., 2006; Hasian, 2006; Taylor, 2007). Fear appeals have controlled public 
deliberation during times of war, including nontraditional conflicts like The Cold War and The 
War on Terror. Greenwald's refutations of the need for secrecy are essential for public 
deliberation. However, his reporting may also be more successful simply because of timing, 
and this limitation is important to note. The NSA leaks are the most recent leaks and therefore 
have occurred the longest after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Greenwald (2014) notes that 
“Americans now consider the danger of surveillance of greater concern than the danger of 
terrorism” for the first time since 9/11 (p. 197).  
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 Second, an emphasis on journalistic judgment differentiates the NSA leaks from past 
“data dumps” of large amounts of information. Greenwald calls for journalistic discretion in 
the leak of classified information, but goes beyond that to encourage journalists to use their 
judgment to actively report this information to the public. Greenwald demonstrates a concern 
about the role of journalists in the public sphere. This concern contributes to the ongoing 
discussion of journalism by public sphere scholars. Greenwald supports the idea of journalists 
as special actors within the public sphere who should supply information to the public for 
debate (Bitzer, 1987; Hauser, 1987). On an activist level, this finding could help future 
journalists and whistleblowers to judge and release information in a way which does not harm 
national security and promotes robust public discussion.  
 Third, portraying Snowden carefully and with transparency contributed to the 
effectiveness of the NSA leaks. This study complements Cloud's 2014 examination of Chelsea 
Manning. Cloud (2014) found that the media depicted Manning as sexually confused or an 
enemy of the state. Manning's case differs from Snowden's because Manning did not employ a 
reporter to cover her leaked information. From a critical perspective, unfortunately, Snowden 
may have also reaped the benefits of being cisgender. Greenwald worked tirelessly to portray 
Snowden as a “normal guy,” and accusations of sexual deviance did not gain much traction 
(though, notably, were still attempted to discredit Snowden, see footnote). Along with this 
advantage, Greenwald's coverage of Snowden was able to introduce some more successful 
narratives for leakers, for example that Snowden was courageous and patriotic.  
 Greenwald's case is one of many instances of resistance to security measures post-9/11, 
an area which warrants greater study by rhetorical scholars. Much work has focused on 
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security and government rhetoric, but less is focused on critical examination of and resistance 
to state surveillance. Scholars should continue to ask why some resistive messages gain 
traction and others do not.  
 Ultimately, Greenwald started a successful conversation about US surveillance, but this 
conversation has been slow to turn into reform. The documents Snowden leaked shocked 
many Americans and received ample news coverage from journalists worldwide, but few have 
taken up Greenwald's call to activism against the US surveillance state. Though American 
public opinion has changed slightly, no major legal reforms or social movements have 
occurred as a result of the NSA leaks. This inactivity reflects a flaw in Greenwald's rhetoric—
which provides an extensive analysis of the problem, but vague solutions. However, 
Greenwald's solutions provide an important critique of surveillance, by pointing out that 
personal acts of resistance do not resolve systemic harms caused by mass surveillance, 
especially the control that surveillance creates over freedom of expression. Greenwald's focus 
on harms caused to democracy leads to a call to action for the public sphere, and a taking back 
of surveillance power from isolated technical communities. By highlighting the conflicting 
values of the public and the NSA, he demonstrates how the public sphere can be used to resist 
surveillance.  
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